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The proposed research seeks to identify the factors contributing to job retention

and job attrition in terms of why an airport security checkpoint screener would try or
want to stay on the job or leave the job. By identifying the causes of employee
satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and by understanding the integral components of
employee turnover can develop appropriate interventions that curb existing retention
problems (exceeding 70% annually in most facilities). Aside from the obvious costs
affiliated with recruiting, selecting, and training replacement employees, there is likely
to be a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of airline passenger screening when a
substantial percentage of the workforce are novice workers. The success and deterrent
potential of an airport security checkpoint is primarily dependent on the personnel who
operate it. As with most safety-critical systems, there is no room for system-induced
or operator-induced errors.
To date there has been little emphasis placed on the selection of airport security
checkpoint sreeners. In a report by the 1989 Presidents Commission on Aviation

v

Security and Terrorism (Presidents Commission, 1990), the commission was critical
toward the Federal Aviation Administration with regard to how little attention was paid
on recruiting and motivating security personnel. The significance of the work has
many dementions to it. Ideas and conclusions formulated from these concerns and
issues are essential in addressing the empirical attention needed in this area. They also
carry strong implications toward the standardization of screening and hiring of airport
security checkpoint screeners and towards the development of a standardized protocol
that can be applied industry-wide.
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Airport Security Checkpoint Screener:
An Analytical Study of Job Retention and Attrition Factors

Introduction

Air travel is by far the safest method of transportation. It is important,
however, to place the increasing problem of aviation terrorism and sabotage into proper
*

perspective. This is especially meaningful as it relates to the significance of the role
each individual airport security checkpoint screener has in controlling this increasing
problem. The goal of this thesis is to focus on the human factors issues of job retention
and attrition within airport security companies who are contracted by the airlines. "The
success and continuity of any organization...is ultimately determined by the
productivity of its employees as well as the satisfaction that they derive from their jobs,
fellow workers, management, and the rewards system of the organization" (Dunn and
Stephens, 1972, p. 2). Given the negative effects of unwanted employee turnover on
airport security checkpoint operations, organizational sensitivity to the antecedents of
employee satisfaction and intentions to leave is consequential and warrants empirical
attention.
By the year 2000, airlines around the world will transport nearly two billion
passengers a year. Even if the accident rate equals that of the lowest year in aviation
history, a thousand passengers will lose their lives each year. The factors that
1
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contribute to the dangers of air travel can range anywhere from human factor mistakes,
aging aircraft, crowded skies, over-burdened air traffic control systems, to abrupt
weather. Intricating these aviation and airport problems is the ever present distressing
and sophisticated threat of terrorism and sabotage. Unfortunately, history has shown
that motivation to achieve competent security frequently comes in the wake of tragic
incidents.
Impact and Bflferrivftngss

The safeguarding of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference has been
a matter of critical concern to Governments of the world. The civil aviation program
has no option but to take the problem seriously. The risk of a terrorist incident or
sabotage act is always present and "...is not confined to the Middle East and other
trouble spots in the world" (Oster, Strong, and Zorn, 1992, pg. 143) (see Figure 1).
Such unjust acts have had a profound world-wide detrimental effect on civil aviation
operations. For example, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
on December 21, 1988, reminds travelers that the reality of the risk is real and can take
place anywhere.
Security factors that contributed directly to the destruction of Flight 103
involved a combination of errors on the part of the air carrier and its security
contractor. "These factors were passenger screening; baggage handling, especially
matching passengers and their bags; almost complete reliance on X-ray equipment to
find explosive devices; and the lack of an integrated information system to track
passengers and their baggage on specific flights" (Vosburgh, 1993, p. 5). The cost of

3

Explosions Aboard Aircraft by Region
1950-1989
S. America 5
^ ^ ^ N. America 18
W. Europe 15

E. Europe 1
Middle East 9
Asia 20
Africa 4

Explosions - Region (Total 72)
Figure 1. Explosions Aboard Aircraft by Region

these unlawful acts in terms of to the loss of human lives, disruption to air operations,
and negative economic impacts is unfathomable. Terrorism against civil aviation will
always be a threat. There are no set rules due to the fact that the elements involved
will vary with the environment and location. The emotional attractiveness of such a
malleable, newsworthy target allures those who commit acts of unlawful interference.
As these acts interfere with the civil aviation system, a demand for continued
resistance is required. There must be more " . . . world wide vigilance and the
enhancement of security measures" (Sutherland, 1992, p. 6).
The late 1960's and early 1970fs had a sudden and unexpected increase in
aircraft hijackings. The response was a coordinated and extensive civil aviation
security system instituted by the United States Government and the International Civil

4
Aviation Organization (ICAO). A significant part of that system is aircraft passenger
security checkpoint screening using metal detectors and X-ray machines. "Since the
initiation of mandatory security screening procedures in 1973, over 11 billion persons
and their carry-on items have been screened. This has resulted in the detection of over
45,600 firearms and more than 20,150 arrests" (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991
p. 11). The effectiveness of the security procedures can be portrayed by comparing the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) hijacking statistics for domestic air carrier •
operations before and after the onset of the passenger security screener process (see
Figure 2).
"During the July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989 reporting period, over
535 million persons were processed through screening checkpoints at U.S. airports
resulting in the detection of 1,464 firearms" (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991,
Feb.). Of these 1,406 (96%) were detected by x-ray inspection, 30 (2%) by physical
search, and 28 (2%) by use of metal detectors. In addition, ten explosive/incendiary
devices were discovered during this period including five grenades, three fireworks,
one flare gun, and one tear gas device. During this six month period, 764 persons
were arrested at airport security screening checkpoints for unauthorized carriage of
firearms or explosive/incendiary devices. "Study Tallies" (1991) analyzed hostile acts
against civil aviation between January 1980 and December 1990. During that 11-year
period, the investigators uncovered 304 hijacking incidents accounting to one every 13
days. Foreign air carriers however encountered the majority of these hijackings.
Aeroflot had the highest with 24, followed by LOT Airlines with 16, and Iran Air
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Figure 2: The Effectiveness of Passenger Screening

with 15. Although hijacking incidents do not materialize an immediate threat for U.S.
operators, St. John (1991) stated, "As international security tightens, the United States,
with its lack of safegards at airports, becomes more inviting to terrorists" (p.85).
Oster, Strong, & Zorn (1992) concluded that the overall volume of terrorist activity has
grown at an annual rate of about 12 to 15 percent during the 1980's. If that rate of
increase continues, there could be a doubling of terrorist activity by the end of the
decade.
Routine inspections evaluating the effectiveness of airport security checkpoints
report an average success rate of 90% in detecting test weapons that are designed to
imitate explosives, incendiary, and deadly or dangerous weapons. Contrary to the
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FAA 1991 report, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) Report (1987, April)
reported that the nationwide success rate in the detection of test weapons was only
80%. Additionally, the GAO report found immense variability with the success rate
among airport security checkpoints in detecting test weapons. The report illustrates the
lack of effectiveness and clearly demonstrates a need to focus on and accentuate
productivity for airport security checkpoint personnel through job satisfaction and
motivation.
Job satisfaction is believed to have a direct bearing on motivation and job
productivity. Job satisfaction is also believed to be reflected in both voluntary and
involuntary turnover. Studies have shown a link between the employee's job
satisfaction and the employee's speed and ability in acquiring skills on the job. Both
intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors should be reviewed to invigorate
effectiveness. The Conference Board Inc. (1971) reported that motivation and
productivity are inextricably linked. "Job design that takes into consideration human
needs and motivations can provide the needed impetus for increased productivity. This
is true despite automation, improved engineering, and other technological advances.
Without worker motivation a large segment for the sought-for productivity standard is
missing" (The Conference Board, Inc., 1971, p. 10).
Emphasis on hiring practices to find qualified personnel with the proper
motivation will result in a more suitable work force while reducing attrition for those
not proficient or properly motivated in their profession. More importantly, developing
a screening program that identifies and staffs the nation's airport security system with
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the most capable, motivated, and qualified individuals will enhance the overall success
and deterrent potential of the security system.
As previously stated, the job of a security checkpoint screener is an extremely
important one. Their efforts are responsible for the protection of the lives and safety of
millions of travelers each year. How well each screener performs his/her job makes
this protection possible. The task of the security checkpoint screener is so important to
the overall security system that it is necessary to hire those who are best able to do the
job, and who are willing to do the job for a long period of time. The use of
psychological principals in the job environment have resulted in practical goals to
reduce employee turnover, absenteeism, and low productivity. Additionally, they have
improved the design of a working environment, designed human-machine systems that
optimize human abilities while minimizing error, and raised workers' morale and
motivation.
How airport security companies structure the management of all the daily work
experiences of its security checkpoint screeners has a dominate influence on the
performance of those screeners. Precise personnel selection and training are
consequential, indeed critical, for airport security organizations. "But no matter how
perfectly the company performs these operations, if the organization is badly
structured, performance in the long run, will be poor" (Yorks, 1976, p. 3). It is
important to remember that security checkpoint screening is the element of aviation
security most familiar to the traveling public. How a screener acts, looks, and
communicates are all critical to a security system's effectiveness. The human element
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in the security checkpoint process will remain paramount. It takes specific abilities and
personality to be a successful screener. According to Wallis (1993) the performance of
a checkpoint security screener (at the interface with the traveling public) can be judged
to an extent, by the passengers. The general attitude of the checkpoint security
screener is easy to detect. Personal presentation and appearance is readily observable.
Since aviation security is based on multiple layers of overlapping effort, it is
highly dependant on each of the participants carrying out their individual
responsibilities. The security screening checkpoint is a team effort that requires
cooperation and excellent communications between everyone involved. The
responsibility for establishing an effective and integrated aviation security program is
shared by the air carriers, the airports, and the FAA. Thaher (1991) notes that in 1990
the FAA spent $10 million on the development of new passenger screening, explosive
and explosive devices and baggage inspection technology. To date, however, there has
been little emphasis and attention placed on the recruiting and motivating of airport
security checkpoint screeners. The success and deterrent potential of the security
system is primarily dependent on the personnel who operate it. Fundamental attributes
of screener success are determined by human factor issues. Performance issues and
retention and attrition factors all have significant roles in the aviation security arena.
Whether it be the safety of passengers and crew, the cost in training, or the success rate
among airport security checkpoints in detecting weapons, each impinge upon the
general concept of employee job satisfaction.
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In addition, an effective national aviation security checkpoint screening program
is based on adequate FAA guidance in the selection of screeners and in their training,
as well as on the importance that individual airlines place on security. The security
checkpoint screener must be able to effectively operate security equipment under
varying workload conditions, (e.g., during peak periods when passengers are in a
hurry, airport "rush hours", etc.). As with most safety-critical systems, there is no
room for system-induced or operator-induced errors. Human factors issues (high
turnover, low pay, hiring problems, and poor training) have plagued the larger airports
particularly. Moore (1991) notes that motivation is a highly significant problem.
Situations are handled all to often by negative reinforcement rather than positive
reinforcement. These human factor issues are a prolific area for research, and much
needs to be done to allay the job satisfaction and motivation problems these screeners
encounter. The selection process of those persons who have the necessary attributes for
target detection or abnormalities are relatively unexplored. In addition, one of the
trends that has developed in the airport security industry is that the air carriers are using
the contract security officers for duties other than predeparture screening. The logic
for this is purely economic reasons. Contract security employees are utilized for
international greeters, for pushing wheel chairs, and for monitoring the security of
incoming and out going baggage (Moore, 1991). Although this provides a variety for
the security checkpoint screener and makes the job more interesting (to some), it does
require the necessary attributes, personality traits, attitudes, and motivation.
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Predictive modeling of potential security checkpoint screeners is a key in
screening for the appropriate candidates. The implications for cost savings in training
and reduced turn-over are enormous. This suggests that it may be useful to use expert
modeling for the determination of how successful security checkpoint screeners process
information and arrive at a desirable level of competency. Understanding how
successful security screeners think and perform will aid in establishing a selection and
training guideline. Although individual differences are difficult to identify and
quantify, the identification of satisfiers and motivators in successful screener operations
can prove to be beneficial. The study of these can aid in the optimum performance
model. Research proves that companies that satisfy employees' desires for good
managerial relations, respect, fair and adequate compensation, and offer opportunities
for growth and development through training, are reaping the benefits.
The President's Commission (1990) on Terrorism and Aviation Security
concluded that the FAA paid little attention to the recruitment, training, and motivation
of the aviation security work force. The agency was further criticized for not
integrating the work force with modern technology to achieve a systems approach to
security. At hearings before the Commission on February 2, 1990, it was pointed out
to FAA officials that studies of human factors issues in security was visibly absent from
the agency's research and development effort, despite human factors affiliated
recommendations unfurled over a decade earlier.
In 1978, following inadequate test results of the security screening process, a
task force of the FAA and airline security personnel studied ways to improve
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performance at airport security screening checkpoints. This task force's report,
referred to as the Human Factors Study, recommended several actions which were
endorsed by both the FAA and the airlines. For the most part, these recommendations
focused on the personnel-related aspects of the operation such as high employee
turnover rates, low pay, and insufficient training. Although the FAA and the airline
industry endorsed the study's recommendations, the air carriers have been slow in fully
implementing them (GAO, July, 1987). In fact, in July 1987, the GAO reported to .the
Secretary of Transportation that an investigation of screening processes at six major
airports found that many of the problems that were addressed in the 1978 human
factors study still existed. For example, security firm managers reported that airport
security screening personnel were still being paid at, or near, minimum wage and that
low pay contributes to high-turnover rates (in some cases, 100 percent annually) and
further resulted in problems in hiring capable people.
Statement of the Problem
The human element in the security checkpoint process is and will remain
paramount. Acts of unlawful interference are not everyday occurrences and the
likelihood of a security checkpoint screener actually being in a situation to thwart a
tragedy is exceptionally unlikely. This prompts a principal motivation to be missing.
The checkpoint security screener must be able to effectively operate the safety-critical
system with 100 percent detection rates despite the fact that the actual task of the
checkpoint is highly routine and a potentially boring job. Job training, recurrent
training, and longevity on the job all play an important role on job performance in the
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parameters within which the air carrier will have to plan are those laid down in the
carrier's own national legislation. The regulations of the countries the airline goes to
will also have to be included to ensure the air carrier complies with the requirements of
en route airports.
Air carriers' security branches vary in size and complexity. Some air carrier
security operations are very large while others use just a handful of personnel to staff
the airports they serve. "At the start of the 1990s, American Airlines claimed to be •
employing more than a thousand security personnel" (Wallis, 1993, pg. 80). At the
time of this writing, there were over 15,000 screeners employed by some 46 security
firms nationwide. Most air carriers look to their government's security agencies to
collect information and consequently take appropriate actions to respond to this
information. The air carriers evaluate the risk opposing their operation, making crucial
decisions and staffing manpower accordingly. Air carrier operations must be
adequately flexible to meet the varying conditions that are entailed within the operation.
Regulatory Background

In December 1972, air carriers were given 30 days to institute a program of 100
percent screening of all passengers and carry-on luggage. Part 121.538, the rule
affecting security by air carriers, was issued on January 31, 1972, and required each
certificate holder to adopt and implement a screening program. Thirty days later the
order was amended to require each air carrier to submit its screening program to the
FAA. The air carrier is held responsible by the FAA for the effectiveness of screening
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procedures, and for developing security plans which assure prevention or deterrence of
aircraft hijacking, sabotage, and related criminal acts.
Few air carrier operations were staffed with enough personnel to accommodate
the increased labor burden these new screening requirements required. "No one was
certain how long these requirements would last; it would not be good management to
hire a considerable number of new employees only to let them go six months later if
the requirements were canceled" (Moore, 1991, pg. 91). These factors have forced •
most air carrier operations to go to outside contract screening companies. Whether an
air carrier decides to contract the required screening relies on a variety of
circumstances. Among these circumstances, cost remains the primary factor (Moore,
1991). In addition to cost, another advantage to hiring an outside contractor is the
internal flexibility the air carrier operator is given. For example, the air carrier
operator is relieved of hiring or firing employees, scheduling vacations, handling pay
raises and the scheduling of shifts. The downside to the subcontract passenger and
security screening companies is that "...these companies unfortunately have had a
record of seeking to maximize the profit potential of their contracts by hiring staff at
minimum wage levels and by providing the most elementary training" (Wallis, 1993,
pg. 49). The performance standards consequently fall considerably short of what is
expected and required. The aviation industry, more specifically the airlines, have been
accused of a penny-pinching attitude toward security (St. John, 1991).
The FAA Act of 1958 was amended to implement the convention for the
suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This Act (Public Law 93-366) was
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enacted by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States Congress. It
was signed by the President on August 5, 1974, and contained two acts; the Antihijacking Act of 1974 and the Air Transportation Act of 1974. The Air Transportation
Act of 1974 requires that "...all passengers and all property intended to be carried in
the aircraft cabin in interstate air transportation be screened by weapon-detecting
procedures or facilities employed or agents of the air carrier."
Section 315 of the General Aviation Act directs the FAA to prescribe

•

regulations requiring the screening of all passengers and carry-on items for the presence
of unauthorized items. Section 316 of the Act also requires regulations to protect
persons and property aboard aircraft from acts of criminal violence and piracy. A
certificate holder is an airplane operator subject to FAR-107 (regulations covering
airport operator security) and FAR-108 (regulations covering aircraft operator
security), and is engaged in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations,
or both. Air carriers are responsible for developing and implementing security plans
which pledge prevention or deterrence of aircraft hijacking, sabotage, and related
criminal acts (i.e., the carriage of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or dangerous
weapon). Each air carrier security operation is governed by a document referred to as
the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) which is approved by the FAA.
The airport operators are to provide law enforcement support to screen and maintain
security programs which deter and hinder unauthorized entry into air operations areas
(Federal Aviation Administration, 1991).
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After the tragedy of Pan Am 103, the President's Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism was formed on August 4, 1989, by Executive Order 12686
(President's Commission, 1990). The Commission's goal was to conduct a
comprehensive study and appraisal of the practices and policy options to prevent
terrorist acts against civil aviation. The President's Commission Report (1990)
emphasized the significance of having a consistent set of selection and training
standards for airport security and was demonstrated by the Pan Am 103 investigation.
In addition, the investigation suggested that the security weaknesses found could be
connected to breakdowns in airline security personnel performance. For example, the
investigation found that Pan Am security personnel failed to properly screen 38
passengers at London's Heathrow airport.
Currently, the FAA has initiated several programs to counter terrorist threats.
The FAA sponsors aviation security training programs at the Transportation Safety
Institute (TSI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma under the authority of Section 316 (c) of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The current programs relating to aviation safety and
security are administered by the Aviation Security Division of TSI (Federal Aviation
Administration, 1991). In its security program the FAA identifies the core
requirements and guidance for the initial, recurrent, and on-the-job training of airline
screening personnel at domestic airports. Despite the FAA's efforts to standardize
security training programs, several task forces and studies have found that the quality
of security screener training provided by the airlines and contracting security firms
varies widely between and within an airline (President's Commission, 1990).
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Passenger S e r e n i n g

One of the fundamental elements of the aviation security system is passenger
screening. By requiring passengers to pass through a security checkpoint for the
inspection of their personal and carry-on items, it is possible to establish a sterile area
in which there are no unauthorized weapons, explosive devices, and/or other objects or
devices that could be used to harm or threaten aircraft, air carrier personnel, or
passengers. Studies conducted by United Airlines during the early stages of the
predeparture screening program found that there was an average of 1.2 bags per
passenger. Wallis (1993) notes that enormous sums are expended on security
checkpoint screening staff and are largely wasted in the since that the level of the
screeners performance is inadequate to offset any act of unlawful interference. As
stated previously, the airlines bid out security contracts to security companies and
usually the lowest bid is awarded the contract. "One natural element of such a bid is a
low wage for the staff" (Wallis, 1993, p. 127). Consequently, the caliber of security
personnel hired under such conditions correlates to the wage structure and falls far
short "... of that needed for the function" (Wallis, 1993, p. 128). Although air carriers
spend large sums on security checkpoint screening personnel by way of agency
contracts, there is little cost effectiveness that is associated with this activity. Only 65
cents per passenger ticket goes toward security, in contrast to the passenger facility
charge which can top out at $3.00 per passenger ticket. These restricted means affect
the quality of the equipment obtainable as well as the quality of personnel selection,
training, and benefits. "The last thing airlines want to consider is spending more
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money for security. What they do not seem to realize is that security must be a
component part of their service, just like on-time flights, safety, and passenger
satisfaction" (Vosburgh, 1993, p.6.). McKinnon (1986) notes that there has been some
cost-vs-benefit ratio discussions in terms of dollars. See Table 1 for an example in
1985 of security costs effecting the airlines:

Tahlel- Security Costs Effecting Airlines (1985)
*
•**
+

$74, 794 per firearm detected
$155,642 per related arrest
$19,821, 605 per hijacking or related
crime believed to have been prevented

Despite this, the threat of being screened before entering a sterile area and the fear of
related security measures in effect have eliminated thousands of potential crimes and
hijackings.
Passenger screening today is accomplished with metal detectors, X-ray machines
and bag checks. Improved technological machinery has been and is currently being
developed and upgraded as an aid in the detection of weapons. Guns, knives, and hand
grenades are favorite weapons of hijackers. These devices can usually be detected with
X-ray equipment (the output of an X-ray machine is a visual image of the object being
examined). Even attempts to mask or hide such items can usually result in their
identification using X-ray equipment. Haas (1976) notes that X-ray devices are the
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only practical means today of providing an interpretable visible image of objects and
their contents with non-destructive penetrating radiation. However, the actual job task
of X-ray screening can be very monotonous requiring both motivation and a positive
mental attitude.
The effectiveness of X-ray screening depends upon the skill of the operator in
recognizing the objects that are displayed on the X-ray monitor and proper techniques
to screen a person entering the sterile area or a screener providing a bagcheck to a bag
entering the sterile area. Detecting unauthorized weapons, explosive devices, and/or
other objects or devices that could be used to harm or threaten aircraft, air carrier
personnel or passengers is extremely difficult for even highly trained technicians. Most
airport security personnel are not highly trained and not all people can be trained.
Although checkpoint screeners are, for the most part, extremely conscientious some
may have inherent weaknesses. Low wages draw two types of social classes to the job.
The first social class is the undereducated, and less experienced. These people have
trouble getting a higher paying job because of their lack of education, lack of working
skills and experience, scarcity of jobs, and/or interests in security work. Aubrey and
Felkins (1989) note that education has been shown to increase employee needs for
greater influence in the work place. The second class is the older population who is
more interested in passing time, being around people, flexible job hours, enjoying their
co-workers, and who do not consider money an important role in the selection of the
job. Moore (1991) states that many of the more effective security screeners are older
adults, and they tend to be long term employees. Guide (1991) notes that the
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physiological literature indicates that there usually are physical decrements in vision,
audition, cognitive processing, vigilance, and memory with increasing age. The
physiological and psychological effects are an essential everyday part of the screening
task.
A high percentage of the security checkpoint screeners have never held or even
seen a real explosive device in their lifetime. Their ability to detect an obvious threat
is based upon the training they receive and the test objects they see most frequently. •
Some obvious threats, such as a pipe bomb, grenade, gun, knife, and handcuff are easy
to detect because they have distinctive shapes and are very dense so they show up well
on an X-ray. These items are easy to detect regardless of their orientation, profile,
angle, and/or location, unless they are masked by an opaque object. If this is the case,
the X-ray image appears as a possible threat and should be bag checked. On the other
hand, some obvious threats such as time bombs, dynamite bombs, and plastic bombs
can be extremely difficult to detect and are frequently missed during tests. These
objects are not dense and can be penetrable on the X-ray image. In addition, these
objects are not only difficult to detect when they are isolated, but they are even more
difficult to detect when cluttered by other objects. Training is a paramount issue in the
detection process.
Theoretical Basis

Experts agree that security checkpoint screeners must develop and maintain a
high degree of proficiency at their work. The detection of any explosive, incendiary,
or deadly or dangerous weapon in individual carry-on or checked in baggage is a
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continuously changing equation that presents multidisciplinary security challenges (e.g.,
vigilance, scanning, prediction, and knowledge of materials). Haas (1976) noted that
the usefulness of X-ray equipment is only starting to be comprehended. There are few
other practical ways which are used to inspect carry-on or checked articles of
passengers. These are especially effective ways "...which do not significantly invade
people's privacy" (Funke, 1992, p.30). The detection of dangerous weapons from
obscure X-ray images of all types of baggage relies heavily on the skill of a screener!
Funke (1992, p.30) stated, "Little attention has been given to this critical human
component although it represents a critically weak link in the airport security system".
The FAA's testing of the effectiveness of the screening process is relatively
unsophisticated. The agency historically utilizes test weapons, such as simulated pipe
bombs, three sticks of simulated dynamite tied together with a large clock and attached
wires, encapsulated hand guns, and dead grenades to test the x-ray equipment and the
ability of the operator to detect a potentially lethal weapon. The test object is generally
placed in a briefcase or bag with little or no effort to conceal, clutter, or disguise it.
The briefcase or bag is then taken by the FAA inspector posing as a passenger to enter
the sterile area. The FAA inspector enters the screening point and is submitted to the
screening process. One would expect near 100% detection rates since the FAA test
objects resemble only very obvious threats and since the FAA inspectors are not
allowed to hide the test object(s) into the carry-on baggage (GAO, 1987, July). In
addition, airport security checkpoint screeners are often aware that they are being tested
because: a) FAA inspectors are well known to screeners at most airports, and b)
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screening teams look out for each other and signal the presence of the FAA inspector to
other members of the team. One investigator (Vosburgh, 1993) notes that this
approach is not very practical. Most screeners "...would probably not recognize a real
bomb [or threat] since they train primarily to identify test objects similar to those used
during airline and FAA tests" (Vosburgh, 1993, p.61).
Moore (1991) notes the importance of developing innovative ways to improve
the system operator's effectiveness that should always remain a high priority. Studying
checkpoint screener needs and social conditions are two ways to improve motivation
and job satisfaction, hence, positively influencing job performance. Numerous human
factors issues (i.e., lighting and glare, floor grade, work station design, ambient noise
levels, the seating provided for the screening position, the effect of night work and
circadian rhythms on screening performance, the need for training of handling and
lifting heavy loads, and provide good management training to supervisors) can
adversely impact screener performance and reduce the efficiency of the overall security
procedures. Poor work environments may also induce fatigue and may affect personnel
retention. Supporting this concept, Astley and Fox (1975) noted that providing an
improved working environment — as a result of physical changes (e.g., economically
designed chairs, padded floormats) — will influence personnel turnover and absenteeism
in a positive direction.
The President's Commission (1990) noted that the FAA had failed to include
human factors considerations in integrating new technology and training. The FAA's
approach was found to be reactive rather than proactive. Changes were mandated to
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unite human factors into the overall design and management of the security system.
The FAA had failed to consider the human factors involved in aviation security,
particularly those factors in the security checkpoint screener position. The human
factors approach is to improve the security checkpoint screener performance. In
addition to using the human factors approach there are other ways to improve human
performance. These are: (a) select of new personnel who are less likely to make
errors than the current personnel; (b) improve training so that everybody's level of •
performance is improved; (c) motivate the security checkpoint screener to perform
better; and (d) change the social consequences of making an error. It is important that
the employee maintain at least the "...the average level and quantity of output and learn
to perform his task at a satisfactory rate, effective operation also requires that these
duties be performed regularly and faithfully" (Beaumont, 1945, p. 17). ICAO has also
identified areas in aviation security requiring attention. These include: (a) low wages;
(b) lack of career prospects; (c) lack of challenge in the job; (d) lack of authority; (e)
poor working hours; (f) pressure from the airlines to perform during peak hours; (g)
fear of possible health effects (e.g., bomb detonation, sore backs from lifting luggage,
and radiation exposure); (h) penalties for poor performance; and (i) lack of sufficient
knowledge to handle dangerous situations (e.g., armed passengers, and explosive
devices).
To make the overall security system work best, in the effective identification of
weapons and contrab, efforts must be made to improve both human performance and
technology. For the security checkpoint screener operator, learning is a paired process
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consisting of the acquisition of the required responses and inhibition of competing ones.
Unfortunately, error is a necessary part of learning. The ultimate improvement in
security checkpoint screening effectiveness would come from a fully automated security
screening system which would include artificial intelligence applications. The day may
come when security screening is fully automated, but it will not be soon. Hughes
(1993) noted that a key conclusion of the latest National Research Council study is that
there is no single detection technology available today that can provide a high
probability of bomb or weapon detection.
Training Issues
Most of the emphasis has been allocated towards technology and little has been
directed towards the enhancement of human performance. A precisely trained and
extremely motivated operator combined with advanced technology can be effective in
screening for obvious and potential threats. The Conference Board Inc. (1971) notes
that if jobs lack motivational content, material and human resources alike are under
utilized. Training does not have to occur in a formal situation or a classroom. It can
take place in a meeting one on one with a supervisor or in a conversation with a teacher
or a facilitator. A successful training program should improve the moral of the
employees as evidenced by greater devotion to duty, accelerated learning rates,
decreased absenteeism, fewer complaints, and a smaller labor turnover.
While there are many physical techniques designed to make the job easier and
more effective, security checkpoint screeners cannot and should not be entirely
eliminated from the system. Training is needed to confirm that the operator remains
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cognizant of the prevailing technology and demands required on the job. Training
renders a solution in the reduction of errors and skill development. "A properly trained
and highly motivated operator, combined with suitable screening enhancement tools can
be very effective in screening for dangerous objects. This is why the need to develop
innovative ways to improve the system operators' effectiveness should always remain a
priority" ("Keeping the Operator", 1992, p. 41). Senders and Moray (1991) note that
well-trained operators whose knowledge and skill are appropriate to the task will make
fewer errors than unskilled operators. Motivation can be developed and maintained by
good system design, both in the human machine interface and the working policies.
Senders and Moray (1991) note if training and psychology are relied on to reduce
error, then one must start by adopting a different attitude towards errors. In addition,
one can regard error only as a clue to the processing system in the central nervous
system that are responsible for the behavior. Training can be improved by a
combination of both formal and on the job training conducted on an on going basis.
Not all people can be trained, however. Some individuals may possess inherent
weaknesses. The conceivable efficiency of security personnel should be considered at
the time of hiring. Wallis (1993) elucidates that training and refresher training should
strive at ensuring the personnel understand precisely what items they are seeking and
how to identify the components on the x-ray monitor. People who are less likely to
make errors should be selected as a security checkpoint screener to provide the needed
security level. On the other hand, Senders and Moray (1991) note that personnel
selection is not a very powerful method of improving systems. The Civil Rights Act

states that an employer can not discriminate between race, age, and gender. Well
trained staff are key to an effective security program and is a positive alternative to
personnel selection. Standards are paramount if the security arena is to be successful in
preventing additional attacks against the civil aviation industry. "Implementation of
these provisions requires highly trained staff at all levels, and the training of security
personnel should be considered a high priority" (Sutherland, 1992, p.6). Training
should improve the operator skills and retention levels.

•

The actual tasks of the airport security checkpoint personnel are highly routine
and provide the elements for a boring and dry job. With boredom comes inefficiency.
Wallis (1993) notes that boredom and complacency from the checkpoint job task have
to be met with effective man-management routines. Senders and Moray (1991)
emphasize that people can be trained to perform better, not necessarily to make fewer
errors. Shields and Maddox (1991) note that training can reduce workload at the same
time that it improves performance, and it can assist the individual in meeting the task
demands. Along with training Wallis (1993) notes that once a security checkpoint staff
has been engaged, their management becomes a fundamental ingredient in the security
process.
Current Training Methods

Most screeners are trained with obvious test items, and are only instructed on
complete explosive items and not their components. Assessments by ICAO of the
security situation of some 34 countries confirms that deficiencies are characteristic due
mainly to the inadequacy of training practices. A program that recognizes the

individual and the diverse characteristics of states has been designed to meet the needs
and to improve the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of adequate civil aviation training
in the developing world. "The content of the ICAO training program for aviation
security, in the form of standardized training packages (STPs) is based on an objective
analysis of the tasks to be performed and the skills and knowledge required to perform
them" (Sutherland, 1992, p.6). The training requirements effect all levels of
personnel. For example, the Basic Airport Security Personnel Training Course has 14
modules and activities. Among a list of 14 modules and activities that are provided
are: (a) 9 hours of training for passenger screening and physical search of passengers;
(b) 8 1/2 hours of training for X-ray examination of baggage; and (c) 5 1/4 hours of
Physical inspection of baggage. The course has the duration of 12 working days, of
which 75 percent involves formal class room instruction and 25 percent involves
simulated practice exercises and field events. Sutherland notes that upon finishing
AVSEC 123/Basic, the trainees will be capable of performing the following tasks: (a)
work and move in and about an airport facility; (b) communicate and cooperate with
other airport agencies; (c) control the movement of people and vehicles by means of
access control techniques and systems; (d) guard and patrol airport vulnerable areas,
facilities and aircraft; (e) recognize weapons and explosive/incendiary devices; (f)
inspect, screen and search passengers and baggage; (g) respond to airport emergency
situations; and (h) escort people and consignments. "This Program will assist in
meeting the present human resource training requirements of the world wide aviation
community" (Sutherland, 1992, p. 7). ICAO recommends that airport security

checkpoints should be manned by teams of people who are capable and able to rotate
their functions on a twenty-minute cycle. Five persons working as a single unit can be
sorted into different stations as to provide peak security performance and traffic flow.
The five positions are as follows: one person to direct the flow of passengers; another
to monitor the x-ray screen; a third person, to hand search baggage and components
entering the sterile area that have been selected during the X-ray process for further
examination; a forth to control the flow of traffic through the magnetometers; and a •
fifth security checkpoint personnel to manually frisk people who alarm the
magnetometer. A rotation system minimizes the boredom and provides a variety and
an all-around understanding of the total security checkpoint task (Wallis, 1993). Job
rotation not only gives the employee a broader prospective, but it also increases skills
and knowledge about the job and it provides a variety that relieves boredom.
The training manual published by the Air Transportation Association of
America, makes it clear to new checkpoint security screeners during their initial
training that there is a direct relationship between appearance and effectiveness. A
checkpoint security screener's actions, appearance, and speech must project the
seriousness of the screening process at all times. It is in the airline's best interest to
hire an adequate staff; screeners must not operate in a manner that could jeopardize the
public's expectations of a professional screener. For obvious reasons, a screener
cannot afford to appear inattentive or un-wary in the conduct of their duties and
responsibilities. Staff attentiveness is equally visible. The individual is the key link in
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the passenger security screening process which remains an important part of a proven
civil aviation security system.
Research on Training to Improve Screener Performance

Funke (1979) analyzed a study in 1975 accomplished by Potter. In this study he
examined the ability of perceptual training techniques on developing the skill of
detecting weapons for screeners. Data was obtained from 18 subjects. All were high
school graduates and 9 were college students. Subjects were randomly assigned to one
of three groups: Group 1 was trained with sound and slide presentations dealing with
explosives; Group 2 was trained with an audio and visual program on guns; and Group
3 (the control group) was trained with written instructions concerning items they
should watch for during visual inspections. Subjects were shown 95 slides of x-rayed
baggage of which approximately 30% contained various weapons. Subjects were to
express whether they thought the bag required opening, and if so the reason for their
decision. The slides were shown for 6 seconds followed by a 4 second vacant period.
Three measures of performance were investigated: (a) number of bags
containing weapons which were missed; (b) number of carry-ons which were
incorrectly identified (false alarm) as containing weapons; (c) number of bags correctly
identified as containing weapons, however, the weapons themselves were misidentified.
The number of carry-ons incorrectly identified and the number of carry-ons that had
misidentified weapons were not significantly related to the training conditions. In spite
of this, the type of training had a significant effect on the number of weapons found,
although no statistical data was accounted for by Funke (1979). These findings

mdicated that perceptual training techniques (e.g., sound and slide presentations can
significantly improve target identification on visual inspection tasks, particularly when
targets appear infrequently (Funke 1979). The support data for these findings for the
three groups is as follows: (a) the mean percentage of the weapons missed for
explosive trained (mean = 10.0); (b) the mean percentage of the weapons missed for
gun trained (mean = 22.6); and (c) the mean percentage of the weapons missed for
the control group (mean = 32.8).
Computer-Based Instruction Training

Nadler and Mengert (1993) researched the advantages of computer-based
instruction (CBI) compared to present methods of selection, training, and screener
certification. They utilized a system developed specifically for airline security
checkpoint screeners (Safe Passage System). The Safe Passage System shows airport
security checkpoint screeners x-rayed carry-on images stored in a video database of
approximately 2,000 images. The images depict eight categories: (a) innocent; (b)
suspicious innocent; (c) electronic innocent; (d) explosive; (e) gun; (f) knife; (g)
other sharp objects; and (h) combined/other weapons. The research team collected
data from 1,465 screeners who worked for security companies at five major domestic
airports equipped with the Safe Passage System.
The initial findings (reported in their interim report) were based on data from
500 screeners referred to as their Sample Data Set. Airport security checkpoint
screeners performed simulated screening tests while threat images were presented in
random intervals. Three levels of competence were programmed into each test
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containing 12 different images (i.e., low, medium, high). This enabled the test to have
each level contain increasing percentages of relatively difficult test images: 25, 50,
and 75 %, respectively. The researchers went on to note that four of the eight image
categories (i.e., suspicious innocent, explosive, knife, and other sharp object) portrayed
accuracy levels less than 80% in the Low Proficiency Level, accounting for accuracy
levels of percent, 77.4 %, 76.8 %, and 77.3 %, respectively. Hence the images that
fall into these categories are prevalent to be more difficult to detect. Preliminary
conclusions also indicate a low percentage of critical errors (i.e., errors resulting when
a screener passes a carry-on that should have been held for further inspection). In
addition the research team found that 50% committed no critical errors at each
proficiency level. Based on the this preliminary data, Nadler and Mengert (1993)
concluded that there is however, ample room for improvement in the screener's ability
to distinguish threat items from innocent items in x-ray images of carry-on items.
After analysis of this CBI system it can be concluded that it is the most advanced
training program available on the market today.
International Total Services (ITS) Study
The aviation security contractor ITS investigated if there is a relationship
between screener performance and certain employee characteristics. In 1993, the
Training and Personnel Development Department at ITS completed research of
demographic elements and their relationship to job longevity and performance on FAA
checkpoint testing (ITS, 1993). ITS compared performance criterion for a sample of
3,183 screeners divided into sub-groups by: (a) age; (b) sex; (c) ethnic background;
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(d) educational level; (e) previous employment; (f) military background; and (g)
citizenship. Although the constitution of the United States prevents using these results
for employee selection and hiring, the findings are worthy to mention.
During the study, significant differences were found when comparing screeners
with three or more years tenure vs. nationwide airport security checkpoint screener
population. High tenured screeners were on the average, older, better educated, more
likely to be female, more likely from Asian than black ethnic background, and less

•

likely to possess U.S. citizenship (see Table 2). Nearly one-third of the high tenured

Table 2- Comparison of Screeners Nationwide to Veteran Screeners (data from
ITS Personnel Performance Study, 1993, Selection III:
Employee Retention, Graph 1),
Total Sample
of Screeners (N = 3,183)

Screeners with ;> 3
years

Average age

38 years

54 years

Female

45.4%

57.2%

Asian

10.9%

30.9%

Black

32.4%

12.2%

U.S. Citizen

82.9%

63.0%

* The sample size of the veteran screeners was not reported

sub-group were of Asian background (nearly equally divided by gender), with another
17% Caucasian females. It is important to note that employment tenure was also found
to be twice the duration for the housewife sub-group than any other prior work

experience sub-group. The relationship between educational level and job tenure also
has some findings worth mentioning. ITS found that airport security checkpoint
screeners with four year college degrees and those with advanced college degrees have
the two highest employment duration averages, respectively. It can be noted that the
results presumably reflects the current poor outlook in the job market for college
graduates and a work atmosphere that is appealing for retired professionals. It is
interesting to note that demographic factors were not useful in differentiating screeners
who remained employed less than 60 days from the total sample. The ability to identify
screeners who do not perform effectively (i.e., fail FAA checkpoint tests) is of
potentially significant importance. The data presented by the ITS study however, does
not demonstrate a relationship between demographic issues and the number of FAA test
failures over the proceeding 12-month period. The only substantial difference found is
that the black subgroup is more likely to fail FAA tests than any other ethnic group.
Several demographic factors distinguish superior performance in screeners (i.e.,
as determined by ITS security firm evaluations) from the total nationwide sample that
were similar to the findings for the job tenure criteria. A set of 159 airport security
checkpoint screeners were selected for special recognition because they "... showed an
exceptional ability to repeatedly pass FAA tests." This selected set of screeners
differed from the overall nationwide sample in: (a) mean age (51 years vs. 38 years);
(b) gender (54% vs. 45% female); (c) ethnic background (50% vs. 24.2%
Caucasian); (d) FAA pre-employment average test scores (98 vs. 93.5);

(e) experience background (nearly a three-fold difference in prior military background
and twice the percentage of the total sample with a law enforcement background).
A Hierarchy of Motivations and Needs

Abraham Maslow, a social scientist in the 1950's, developed a theory of how all
motivations fit together. Maslow made sense of the assortment of human motives by
arranging them in a pyramid, which he called a "hierarchy of needs". Wade and
Tavris, 1990, note that Maslow's theory is immensely popular because it is intuitively
logical and optimistic about human nature. There is, as it seems from past and present
research, some uniformity to the seemingly capriciousness of employee wants.
However, Maslow changed the pyramid rank of need over his life. This theory of
motivation is the concept of a ''need hierarchy* in which humans are motivated by the
various needs and can be positioned on a hierarchy of prepotency. These needs are at
different levels. Maslow (1954) notes when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next
prepotent (higher) need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscience life and to serve as
the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not active motivations.
As one level of needs are satisfied, people are no longer motivated by them. People
seek to satisfy the next higher level of needs. The hierarchy basically ascends from
simple biological needs to complex psychological motives, culminating in selfactualization. Maslow contests that needs must be met at each level before a person
can think of the matters posed by the level above it.
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Figure 3. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Maslow's first level of hierarchy begins with the basic physiological needs as
initially the most vigorous in the motivation of the organism and extends through until
a variety of psychological needs (like eating and breathing) are satisfied. Once these
basic psychological needs are satisfied, people pursue the next highest level (see Figure
3). The basic biological motivations are generally found to be at a sufficient level of
satisfaction so that the hierarchy lies within the various psychological and social needs
of the individual. "The concept has led many people to feel that the worker can never
be satisfied with his job" (Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman, 1959, p. 110). The next
highest level consists of security or safety needs. This is where salary, benefits, and
job security function as a role in motivation. On the next level are social or affiliation
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needs. After this level is the esteem level. Respect and recognition are motivational at
this level. Lastly, the highest level of the hierarchy of needs is self actualization.
Maslow articulates that a person cannot become self-actualized if he/she has not
satisfied the need for self esteem.
" Maslow's hierarchy of needs is important to us because it helps to explain why
high salary, good benefits, and job security may not be as important as other
motivational factors" (Cohen, 1990, p. 150). One problem with Maslows theory
however, Wade and Tavris note (1990), is that it is possible to categorize human needs
horizontally instead of vertically, thus portraying a structure that is not a hierarchy (see
Figure 4). In addition, employees have simultaneous needs for basic physical comfort
and safety. An individual can also have simultaneous needs for understanding self
esteem and competence. Thus, each person can develop an individual hierarchy of
motives. A combination of many motives are cultivated in a way that suits one's own
personality and experiences. "Since each individual may present at any one time a
different scramble of his psychological need list, a systematic personnel practice hoping
to cater to the most pre-potent needs of its entire working force is defeated by the
nature of the probabilities. Forgetting for a moment the individual 'need hierarchies' it
can be argued that there is sufficient homogeneity within various groups of employees
to make for a relative similarity of 'need hierarchies' within each group" (Herzberg,
Mausner, Snyderman, 1959, p. 110).
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Herzberg built upon Maslow1 s work and his studies conclude that people have
two categories of needs which affect satisfaction and dissatisfaction with a job.
Herzberg investigated job attitudes within employees in hundreds of companies and
businesses, asking about events each had experienced at work which either had resulted
in improvement in their job satisfaction or had induced a reduction in job satisfaction.
In summary, two chief findings were derived from his studies. The factors involved in
producing job satisfaction were separate and distinct from factors that prompted job
dissatisfaction. According to Herzberg, five factors stand out as strong determinates of
job satisfaction. These are achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility,
advancement (also see Figure 5).
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According to Herzberg's findings, these five factors appeared very infrequently when
the individual employees described events that paralleled job dissatisfaction feelings.
The job dissatisfiers were similar to the job satisfiers in that they also had a
unidimensional effect. See Table 3 for major dissatisfiers found in Herzbergs study
were:

Table 3. Herzbergs Major Dissatisfiers
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

company policy and administration
supervision
salary
interpersonal relations
working conditions
status
job security
personal life

The dissatisfier factors describe the environment and serve primarily to prevent
job dissatisfaction. Since these dissatisfiers have little effect on positive job attitudes,
they have been named the hygiene factors. These needs represent the function of
preventive medicine in the workplace and can never be completely satisfied. The
employee must maintain these hygiene factors or he/she will lose performance.
Herzsberg notes that although performance will not increase do to these hygiene
factors, if an organization or individual is already performing well it, is possible to
maintain these high standards with the hygiene factors. Motivators are in the second
category because they are effective in motivating the individual to superior effort and
performance (satisfying factors). Feelings of achievement, recognition for
accomplishment, challenging work, increased responsibility, and growth and
development are predominate in this second category. These are the factors that
produce job satisfaction; fulfilling the hygiene needs will only prevent job
dissatisfaction.

Herzberg states that separate factors for job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction
need to be considered and, thus, the two factors are not the obverse of each other.
Hence, the opposite of job satisfaction would not be job dissatisfaction, but rather no
job satisfaction; and the opposite of job dissatisfaction is not job satisfaction but rather
no job dissatisfaction. Job satisfaction is mainly unipolar and contribute very little to
job disatisfaction. Conversely, job dissatisfiers contribute very little to job satisfaction.
Herzberg's two factors can be utilized to motivate people to be satisfied with their jobs.
For example, if hygiene factors are reduced (i.e., an employees salary) job
dissatisfaction is going to increase. To avoid job dissatisfaction, hygiene factors must
be maintained at their present levels. To increase job satisfaction, the job motivators
must be increased. "The motivators are task factors and thus are necessary for growth;
they provide the psychological stimulation by which the individual can be activated
toward his self-realization needs" (Herzberg, 1966, p. 78). Both Herzberg's and
Maslows perceptions of human motivation are largely interactive with the personal,
egoistic and the self actualization needs (see Figure 6).
Jnh Retention and Jnh Satisfaction

According to Witt and Hellman (1991), emerging literature has demonstrated
that proportionately more dissatisfied employees intend to leave their employing
organization, while proportionately more satisfied employees intend to stay with their
jobs. Satisfied workers have greater job longevity. Turnover itself has been examined
quite extensively, and "... researchers have identified several antecedents of intent to
leave: a) global job satisfaction, or total-facet job satisfaction (Horn, et al., 1979;
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Kraut, 1975; Lachman & Aranya, 1986; Marsh & Mannari, 1977; Martin, 1979;
Martin & Hunt, 1980; Mobley, et al., 1979; Price & Mueller, 1981; Shore & Martin,
1989; Wright, 1982); b) group cohesiveness, job autonomy, and personal factors
(Marsh & Mannari, 1977); c) supervisor related issues (Horn et al., 1979); d)
jorganizational commitment (Blau & Boal, 1989; Lachman & Aranya, 1986); e) job
involvement (Blau & Boal, 1989); f) workload (Jolma, 1990); g) burnout (Lachman &
Diamant, 1987); and h) life status factors, such as age and tenure in the organization
(e.g., Matin, 1979; Mobley, et al., 1978; Price & Mueller, 1981)" (Witt and Hellman,
1991, p. 1). The most frequent antecedent of intent to leave is job satisfaction. Witt
and Hellman conclude in their research that the intent to leave is conceptualized as an

individual phenomenon. However, a frequent anecdote is the comparison of
organizations as having employees with different levels of intentions to leave and
commensurate turnover rates. "Research on job choice, career choice, and turnover
clearly shows that the kind and level of rewards an organization offers influence who is
attracted to work for an organization and who will continue to work for it" ( Lawler
and Jenkins, 1992, p. 1012). Witt and Hellman (1991) note that Staw, Bell, and
Clausen (1986) note that employees may bring a positive or negative disposition to. the
work setting, process information about the job environment in a way that is consistent
with that disposition, and then experience job satisfaction or dissatisfaction as an
outcome. Witt and Hellman go on to state that it can be likely for an organization and
organizational subsystems to engender different levels of job satisfaction and that this
may affect the intent of an individual to leave; "...thus, to some extent it is a unit-level
phenomenon" (Witt and Hellman, 1991, p. 6). Aggregation of individual job
satisfaction enables prediction of organizational or subsystem intent to leave.
An organization in which its employees are satisfied "...will acquire a
reputation in its community as being a 'good place to work1" (U.S. Department of
Labor, 1974, p. 23). People looking for jobs will tend to go to an organization with
this kind of reputation as one of their first choices, rather than being an organization
who receives its employees as a last resort. This is a problem with many security
companies. "Having more qualified applicants, it can recruit its employees from the
ranks of whom it wants, rather than from those it is forced to take. High productivity
sic (100% detection) may thereby be achieved as a result of the company's ability to
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hire qualified employees" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974, p. 23). The U.S.
Department of Labor (1974) notes Harold Wool in his article "What's Wrong With
Work in America" (1973) by stating that a full employment condition can create a
seller's market for available labor, thus, an organization is obligated to compete for the
scarce labor available and therefore provides better wages, hours and working
conditions. An employee who is not satisfied with a job may not come to work
regularly or promptly.
Predictors of Jnh Satisfaction

Job satisfaction often seems like an ultimate, perhaps unattainable, goal for both
managers and employees. According to Vroom (1964), a substantial amount of
research has been done on job satisfaction and its predictors. The term "job
satisfaction" refers to effective orientations on the part of individuals toward work roles
which they are presently occupying. Job satisfaction is "...typically measured by
means of interviews or questionnaires in which workers are asked to state the degree to
which they like or dislike various aspects of their work roles" (Vroom, 1964, p. 100).
Harris (1974) notes that early attempts to study job satisfaction as a predictor of job
performance have proven to be confusing. Experimental trends in this area have
emphasized studying job satisfaction as a dependent variable, (i.e., as a phenomenon
worthy of studying and understanding in and of itself). These efforts have resulted
mostly in job satisfaction being correlated with many other variables, both personal and
environmental. Vroom continues to point out that there has been little standardization
of job satisfaction measures. "Most investigators 'tailor-make' an instrument for the

particular population they are studying" (Vroom, 1964, p. 100). Job satisfaction is
composed of a complex set of variables that has different levels of satisfaction for
different individuals. Vroom (1964) notes that the research indicates (and for practical
purposes of this Thesis) that job satisfaction can be organized according to work role
variables which have been thought to have an affect on job satisfaction (see Table 4).

Table 4. Work Role Variables Affecting Job Satisfaction
*

V" supervision
V the work group
V job content
/ wages
/ proportional opportunities
V" hours of work

There is, in addition, the problem of defining job satisfaction operationally. Harris
(1974) notes that Wanous and Lawler (1972) found nine different operational
definitions of job satisfaction. "These definitions are really only different approaches
to combining facets of the job which may contribute to job satisfaction, and, therefore,
are not exhaustive or even identical in content" (Harris, 1974, p. 4). Many of the
definitions of satisfaction imply different meanings of what is to be satisfied and are
due to the different measures of job satisfaction that have been used (Harris, 1974).
Supervision

Vroom (1964) notes that Putnam (1930) notes that the Hawthorne works of the
Western Electric Company, state that supervision is the greatest significant factor in
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determining worker attitudes. Vrooms' research has lead him to believe that the
"...relationship between first line supervisors and the individual workman is of more
importance in determining the attitude, morale, general happiness, and efficiency..." of
an employee than any other single factor (Vroom, 1964, p. 105). Quantitative
evidence of supervision and the role it plays with employees is inconclusive. Vroom
(1964) notes that Hertzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell (1957) have noted from
15 studies where workers were asked what made them satisfied or dissatisfied with their
jobs. Supervision was mentioned more frequently than security, job content,
management, working conditions, and promotional opportunities. On the other hand,
when supervision was mentioned as a source of dissatisfaction, it appeared fourth in the
same list of job factors. Vroom (1964, p. 115) sums up the research pertaining to
supervision and job satisfaction by noting that Pelz (1951) states that attempts by
"...influential supervisors to help their subordinates achieve their goals will usually
succeed and will results in higher employee satisfaction"
The Work Group
Developing an understanding of the characteristics of social interaction within
groups which are satisfying and dissatisfying to the individual is a must. Vroom (1964)
quotes Elton Mayo's statement, "Man's desire to be continuously associated in work
with his fellows is a strong if not the strongest characteristic" (p. 119). Every
successful work group must exchange rewards among themselves through interaction.
Vroom (1964) notes that there is some data that suggests that workers' satisfaction with
their jobs is related to opportunities of interaction with others on the job. Vroom goes
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on to state that Kerr, Kopelmier and Sullivan (1951) found that departments which
provide the least opportunity for conversations among its workers have the highest
turnover rates. Vroom also points out that Sawatski (1951) notes that machine
operators, who have restricted opportunity for communication, have a much higher
turnover than employees' who do not operate machines. In this case, restricted
communication is due to the work environment, and the area in which the employee
works. This case is comparable to the hi-tech airport security checkpoints and warrants
further investigation. Group attitudes and similarity stimulate satisfaction. Group
acceptance is another variable that stimulates satisfaction. "If a person's acceptance by
other group members affects the valence of the group for him, it should also affect the
probability that he will withdraw from the group" (Vroom, 1964, p. 124).
Joh Content

Vroom (1964) notes that relatively little research has been carried out on the
motivational consequences of job or task variables. Herzberg, Mausner, and
Snyderman found that favorable job-content factors "..such as achievement and the
work itself tend to produce satisfaction, but their absence does not tend to produce
dissatisfaction "(Vroom, 1964, p. 128). Negative job-context factors (e.g., poor
supervision or working conditions), on the other hand, tend to produce job
dissatisfaction but their absence does not produce job satisfaction. Vroom goes on to
note that Herzberg's own review (Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell, 1957) of
the results of 155 studies involving over 28,000 employed personnel in which the
employees were asked to denote what made them satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs

is not consistent with his previous findings that job content can produce job
dissatisfaction but not job satisfaction. Vroom concludes Herzberg as noting that a
total of five job-context issues (e.g., security, wages, supervision, social aspects of
jobs, and working conditions) are more recurrently mentioned as contributing to job
satisfaction rather than job dissatisfaction, and one issue that applies at least in part to
job-content (e.g., opportunity for advancement) is more frequently mentioned as
contributing to job dissatisfaction.
Wages, Benefits, and Current Rates (Compensation Impact),
Compensation is a crucial and eminent support system that will remain a leading
influence to an employee's approach to the job environment. Compensation includes
any direct or indirect payments to employees, such as wages, bonuses, stock, and
benefits. According to Yorks (1976) research has demonstrated that salaries, and the
form in which it is administered, are a sound influence on job behavior.
Consequently, salaries emerge as a significant element in any structural approach
toward enhancing employee effectiveness. Lawler (1981) articulates that the literature
concerning pay and its role in organizational development has a potential impact on an
organization and can play an important role in determining employee behavior. "How
an organization structures its pay system tends to reinforce certain on-the-job behavior
and communicate much to employees regarding management orientation toward them"
(Yorks, 1976, p. 145). A change in the salaries offered, to overcome the deficiencies
associated with the minimum wage syndrome where this applies, will enable a wider
and better qualified labor market to be tapped (Wallis, 1993). Since security

checkpoint personnel are not highly-paid, the selection process is proportionately more
difficult and the qualifications for employment are not high, and legal standards are
frequently even lower. Yorks (1976) points out one valid generalization which can be
made about the relationship between pay and the enriching of jobs that is applicable to
the security checkpoint screening job. Employees do not immediately ask for more
money as their jobs are made more complete and as they are asked to accept more
responsibility. An example of this is a security checkpoint screener, who has been •
working for a number of months or years, who has not been promoted to a supervisor,
but has taken on more responsibility. In addition, an interest in learning new
responsibilities is the most typical response given by an employee. Groups of workers
are more concerned with job changes and an opportunity for more interesting work than
to accept the structural changes without an up-front guarantee of a pay increase (Yorks,
1976).
Compensation includes any direct or indirect payments to employees, such as
wages, bonuses, stock, and benefits. Gerhart and Milkovich (1992) note that
psychological theories typically specify that pay influences behaviors through its affect
on perceptions and attitudes. Heneman (1985) hypothesized that pay satisfaction is a
key attitude to be related to behaviors such as turnover and absenteeism. It is
hypothesized to be a role of the incongruity between perceived pay and what the pay
level should be. Gerhart and Milkovich (1994) note that Heneman (1985) cites
research by Weiner (1980) showing that pay satisfaction does predict turnover.
Furthermore, pay influences turnover only through the impact it has on pay
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satisfaction. Salary can be classified as a hygiene factor. Herzberg (1966) states that
salary is the most viable, communicable, advertised factor in all the world of work. In
addition, he comments that hygiene factors are connected to salary. "Salary permeates
the thoughts and expressions of people when they view their jobs. In such a
circumstance, it is hardly surprising that salary often seems to be a satisfier to an
individual, (Herzberg, 1966, p. 127).
Reward Systems

Achievement, recognition and responsibility are the most consistent motivational
factors in producing job satisfaction (Herzberg, 1966). "These three describe
accomplishment, reinforcement for accomplishment and increasing challenge -the basic
ingredients of psychological growth" (Herzberg. 1966, p. 127). Pay can directly affect
the success of job satisfaction in two ways. Yorks (1976) states that first, an
employee's job has been enhanced, if significant changes in responsibility have
occurred over time. Compensation will become an issue to an employee who verifies
that he/she will make a contribution and be able to set and accomplish goals that he/she
strive for. Second, Yorks states that"... the manner in which compensation is
administered places pressure on managers and supervisors relative to the development
of their employees" (Yorks, 1976, p. 147). Job satisfaction related to job withdrawal
reactions such as turnover and absenteeism can be solved without deliberately setting
out to increase job satisfaction (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974). According to the
U.S. Department of Labor (1974), many theories state that good job performance leads
to job satisfaction rather than job satisfaction leading to good job performance.
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By combining a secure base pay with incentive or merit pay, special
achievement employees can balance the intrinsic satisfactions of work with the extrinsic
rewards of income and praise. Reward systems to stimulate attention of the security
checkpoint job have proven effective in many airports (Wallis, 1993). Incentives tend
to reinforce very specific behavior on the job. As the research indicates, an incentive
program can lead to significant gains in productivity, and assists in the aspect of the
employee doing the job that is expected. Pay is a powerful reinforcer and subtle

.

differences in emphasis can produce significantly different behaviors and attitudes.
When rewards are focused on the basis of an employees performance, satisfaction is
dependent on performance. The employees that perform the best represent an
interesting retention problem. Lawler and Jenkins (1992) point out that to retain the
best performers a "...reward system must distribute rewards in a way that will lead
them to feel equitably treated when they compare their rewards with those received by
individuals performing similar jobs at a similar level of performance in other
organizations" (p. 1013). In this situation, external comparisons need to be emphasized
because turnover means leaving a company for a more preferable situation at a different
company. In addition, Lawler and Jenkins (1992) state that to be satisfied not only
must the better performers in an organization receive more rewards than less adequate
performers, they must receive significantly more rewards because, as the equity theory
points out, the better performing employees feel that they deserve much more.
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Motivation and the Rypertanry Theory

Blinder, 1990; Lawler, 1971; Lawler and Jenkins, 1992; Nalbantain, 1987; and
Vroom, 1964 convey that when certain delineated conditions exist, reward systems
have been established to motivate performance. These conditions are distinctive in the
"...extensive literature on the expectancy theory: Important rewards must be perceived
to be tied in a timely fashion to effective performance" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992 p.
1013). "Performance motivation depends on the situation, how it is perceived, and Jhe
needs of people" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992 p. 1013). Employees are inherently
neither motivated nor unmotivated to perform with competence. Cantor (1994) notes
that the 3,000 or so weapons per year among billions of pieces of baggage (one in
260,000 airline passengers) is a daunting challenge to the airline and the contract
security companies responsible for safeguarding the flying public. "Adding to the
challenge of the job itself is the high turnover among pre-departure screeners.. .more
than 100% per year in some locations, owing to near minimum wages and local job
markets" (Cantor, 1994, p. 61).
Research shows that the Expectancy theory attributes the motivation decrement
to an upward adjustment of the response criterion and puts forth candid observations
about employee behavior. Detections are affected by the expectations of the operator.
In fact, expectancy can have a positive effect on an employees motivation to perform in
a certain way. "Every behavior has associated with it, in an individuals mind, certain
outcomes (rewards or punishments)" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992, p. 1014). Signal
detection experiments also show that bias is affected by payoff. "If screeners are
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rewarded for detections, being only human, they will say, 'I see it.' Hits will increase
and so do false alarms" (Cantor, 1994, p. 64). If the Expectancy theory holds true for
the security checkpoint screener, one might suspect that his/her motivation is prominent
when: a) the security checkpoint screener believes that the behavior will lead to a
certain outcome; b) the security checkpoint screener feels that these outcomes are
appealing; and c) the security checkpoint screener believes that performance at a
desired level is possible. If 10,000 carry-on bags in a row contain no threats, the .
screener is relatively more likely not to detect a weapon when on really does come
along. "Given a number of alternative levels of behavior, an individual will choose the
level of performance that has the greatest motivational force associated with it, as
indicated by a combination of the relevant expectancies, outcomes, and values" (Lawler
and Jenkins, 1992, p. 1014). If any one of these elements is missing then there is no
motivation. In addition, the Expectancy theory implies that satisfaction is best thought
of as a result of performance rather than a cause of it (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992;
Locke and Latham, 1990; and Porter and Lawler, 1968). The detection of a threat in
an airport security checkpoint operation is an exercise in signal detection. Four
possible outcomes are represented by the security screener: (a) if the screener notes a
problem then there is either a threat present (hit) or no threat present (false alarm); (b)
if the screener does not note a proble then there is either a threat present (miss) or no
threat present (correct rejection). Wickens (1984) noted that simple instructions in
company policy can adjust beta to an appropriate level. Knowledge of results can also
adjust the level of response criterion.

Turnover Issues

It is important to acquire individuals who are efficient and will remain in the
occupation with sufficient tenure to develop adequate expertise and experience. Guide,
1991, notes that Salthouse, 1987, suggested that experience is a very important variable
in moderating human performance and one that should be considered when attempting
to examine any type of individual differences in behavior. Turnover issues have
scourged airport security checkpoint security organizations especially at the larger •
airports and costs the industry dearly. As previously stated, the occupation of airline
passenger security screener is plagued by turnover rates that typically exceed 70%
annually in most facilities. Air carriers are subject to civil penalties when contraband
and incendiary deceives are not detected, many security companies react by terminating
the responsible employee (Moore, 1991). One study by the U.S. Department of Labor
noted that turnover was reliably forecast by a measure of job satisfaction and is
instructive in directing attention away from overall job satisfaction to satisfaction with
particular job aspects as predictors of turnover. The U.S. Department of Labor (1974)
pronounced "...job dissatisfaction may be more likely to contribute to turnover when
Ihe employee is single or otherwise not responsible with family responsibilities. The
association between job satisfaction and turnover will depend to some extent on the
turnover measure used and other mitigating circumstances" (p. 24). Lawler (1971)
claims that organizations that give the most rewards tend to attract and retain the most
people. High reward levels lead to a higher job satisfaction level, and in turn conveys
lower turnover and more job applicants. "Individuals who are presently satisfied with

their jobs expect to continue to be satisfied and, as a result, want to stay with the same
organization" (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992, p. 1012). The correlation between
dissatisfaction and turnover is likely to be stronger in periods of full employment.
Turnover cannot be expected to rise and fall consistently with inclinations in job
satisfaction because turnover trends are so strongly influenced by economic factors.
The most obvious reaction of job dissatisfaction is leaving ones job. In
addition, job absenteeism and job dissatisfaction are found to be related. However, Jike
turnover, job absenteeism will or will not be related to job dissatisfaction depending on
the absenteeism measure employed. According to Lawler and Jenkins (1992) research
has shown that absenteeism and pay satisfaction are related, although the relationship
between the two is not as strong as the relationship between pay satisfaction and
turnover. Beaumont (1945) notes that even among workers who are skilled and
efficient absenteeism may occur to cut down their total overall performance.
Irregularity of attendance also tends to unfavorably affect moral and motivation of
other workers and teammates.
Several studies have shown that by utilizing pay bonuses and other rewards to
pay attendance absenteeism can be reduced. Job satisfaction is best related to turnover
and absenteeism in terms of cross-sectional indicators of job satisfaction of individuals
rather than indicators of trends over time in job satisfaction (U.S. Department of Labor
1974). Lawler (1981) points out that financial rewards can have a significant, even
dominant effect on the attitudes, motivation, behaviors and performance of employees.
Employees consider education, training, seniority, job performance, and the nature of

their jobs when thinking about specific rewards that pertain to them. "There are often
substantial differences among people as to which inputs they think should be most
important in determining their rewards" (Lawler, 1981, P. 14). If an organization job
environment is satisfying and high paying, individuals come to work regularly; if it is
not than the employee will not. Reward systems are only one of several ways to
influence turnover and absenteeism, however, a reward system is potentially effective if
a company is willing to tie important rewards to coming to work. This is often mucii
easier to do than utilizing a reward system with performance because attendance is
easily measurable and it is very visible (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992).
Job dissatisfaction and work-related problems can be grouped into three
extensive types of causes. These are: a) the workers themselves (motivation, skills,
etc.); b) their jobs; and c) the fit between what workers want and what their jobs
provide. "Each type of causal assumption implies a distinctly different coarse of
action" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974, p. 31). If the problems source is attributed
to the employees, some type of training or re-training is advised as a solution.
"Attributing the problem to job characteristics implies that the appropriate solution is
one that involves changing working conditions, while attributing the problem to the
job-worker "fit" points in the direction of redistribution and reassignment" (U.S.
Department of Labor, 1974, p. 31). The identification of such causes is not easy. If
the problems source is attributed to the work environment, rather than the employee,
distinguishing the particular aspects of an employee's job that are the cause and take

subsequent action. This could range anywhere from salary, hours, management, and
level of work.
Scope of the Research
The proficiency and effectiveness of retention and attrition factors can be
achieved and evaluated by focusing upon employee job satisfaction and job
dissatisfaction. The literature strongly suggests that there are parallel relationships
between job satisfiers and dislikes that impact a security checkpoint screener's decisions
to stay on, or leave the job. In fact, the literature points out that job satisfaction and
turnover are negatively related to one another. It is clearly evident that within an
airport security company (contracted by an airline) job retention and attrition factors
among the personnel is exceptionally low and exceptionally high, respectfully. Job
longevity is important in this kind of work environment to establish both the needed
experience and qualifications of becoming a successful screener. The more satisfied an
airport checkpoint security screener is towards his/her job the more likely he/she will
remain on the job and the less probability of leaving. By identifying relevant satisfiers
and dissatisfiers in this population of airport checkpoint security screeners it will be
possible to pinpoint the causes of the retention and attrition problems that plague the
airport security companies, and ultimately hurt the airlines. The identification of these
relevant satisfiers and dissatisfiers will be able to dictate the use of methodologies that
focus on the personnel that operate an airport checkpoint security system.

Method
The objective of the research is to solicit expert opinions from the SME's as to
those job satisfiers in terms of a reason why screeners try to and want to stay on the
job; and to those reasons to dislike the job or quit in terms of wanting to, or actually
leaving the company. This phase of problem-solving research is often hurriedly passed
through, so much that sometimes the results solve the wrong problem with the right
solution. Thus, problem identification will be the main focus of this paper, which will
attempt to bring new solutions of the old, perplexing problems of motivation,
performance, and retention of airport checkpoint security personnel.
The SME has a real understanding of these answers, and will provide them with
consensus through a Delphi workshop. The Delphi process furnishes a means to
measure security checkpoint screener job satisfaction and dissatisfaction to portray
important implications towards retention and attrition problems current airport security
companies are facing. The 1989 President's Commission report emphasized that
security deficiencies were found in the investigation of the accident of Pan Am 103 in
connections to breakdowns in airline security personnel performance. Simply stated the
proficiency and effectiveness of retention and attrition within a security company may
be achieved and evaluated by focusing upon employee job satisfaction, motivation, and
dissatisfaction. The Delphi workshop identifies an ideal security checkpoint screener
environment where employees will be motivated to produce at effective and substantial
levels of security as they fulfill their needs of job satisfaction.
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Subjects

Subjects for this study were selected from the population of on-line Subject
Matter Experts (SME's: airport checkpoint security screeners and supervisory staff)
from three major airports in the United States. These were: (a) Orlando International
Airport (MCO); (b) John F. Kennedy airport (JFK); and (c) San Francisco
International airport (SFO). In all, 34 SME's participated, of which 14 were
supervisors. The SME's were preselected by private security companies (i.e.,
Argenbright Security, and ITS) and the investigation team that headed the Delphi
workshops. The SME's were individuals who were noted as: (a) being employees
that were noted for being successful at their respective positions by their fellow workers
and management; (b) perceived as potential contributors to the process; (c)
demonstrating an ability to work in a team environment; (d) being expressive
individuals that could communicate effectively in a group; (e) being employed for a
minimum of 6 months as a screener within the past 4 years; and (f) a screener who
completed the ATA curriculum and any prescribed security firm and/or State and
Government training. The SME's have had initial training including both classroom
and on-the-job training. Recurrent training and instruction have been given so that the
SME's will maintain their knowledge and proficiency. Participants were also selected
on the basis of having job longevity to be fully knowledgeable about the job at their
particular cite. All participants received $150 compensation for their services. The
SME's being hired to be in the workshop had been given the factual knowledge needed
to participate, and they had been made aware of the most practical and efficient manner

in which to use this knowledge. In addition, all work and consensus is based on SME
experience and knowledge form being the expert in their job field. The procedural
technique to select the sample and sample size was random depending on the
geographic location of the airport, airport congestion, airport size, the number of
working and available SME personnel, and cooperation with the FAA and security
company. The three groups of SME's participating in the Delphi workshops consisted
of 14 (MCO), 10 (JFK), and 10 (SFO) airport security checkpoint screeners.
Instruments

All Delphi workshops were conducted off-site from the security checkpoint
areas. The typical environment for the workshops was an airline training room within
the airport complex, but away from the security firm management and administrative
offices.
Delphi W o r k s h o p !

An effective scheme should optimally obtain inputs from employees while
minimizing distinctive differences. The Delphi technique (Linstone and Turoff, 1975)
provides on such avenue to obtain these data. The Delphi technique also furnishes the
advantage of generating data that can be converted into a survey format for large scale
data collection endeavors at a later time. The Delphi technique is also very versatile, in
that, the costs of putting one together is relatively low, with regard to the envisioned
benefits. The Delphi techniques were originally developed by the Rand Corporation
more than forty years ago for reaching consensus on complex problems (Linstone &
Turoff, 1975). The methodology has enjoyed particularly strong use in forecasting and

long-term planning among planners (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Dalkey, 1967; Helmer,
1967; Pike and North, 1969; Delbecq, 1975; Weaver, 1971). Delphi techniques have
become common methodologies for eliciting analysis, expert opinions, and evaluations
on a wide span variety of topics. In the following Delphi workshop a revised Delphi
method was used to develop SME consensus (explained later). Delphi techniques may
be characterized as a method for structuring group process so that the process is
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex

«

problem (Linstone and Turoff).
During its initial development, the Delphi process used a series of
questionnaires for eliciting analysis, subject matter expert opinions, and ratings. The
Delphi is a set of procedures eliciting and refining the opinions of a group of people
(i.e., SME's). The initial questionnaire typically solicited responses on a broad
question. In this study, however, the Delphi Study will be modified. In most cases it
is easier to talk about a subject than to write about it" (Delbecq, 1975, p. 107). Each
subsequent questionnaire is increasingly more focused since it uses the data from the
preceding questionnaire for refinement (Delbecq, 1975). Typically the process requires
.three interactions for consensus to be reached (Dalkey, 1967). On the other hand, no
standard number of iterations are necessary and the process is considered complete
when the investigators have obtained the desired level of information.
Throughout the history of the Delphi techniques, many methodological pitfalls
have emerged (Linstone, 1975). Primary among these that are germane to this research
project are: (a) ensuring against suppression of divergent views;
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(b) oversimplification of concepts by participants; (c) ensuing a variability of facilities
so as not to obtain a narrow window of expertise; (d) poor execution by inadequate
selection of participants or providing little feedback and explanation of the process; and
(e) guarding against deception about purpose of the process. Many of these
methodological problems are partly caused by anonymous questionnaires where the
investigators and participants are not in physical contact with one another. The
standard Delphi technique thus provides no opportunity for group training or
discussion; the data compiled, the next questionnaire developed, and so on for several
iterations. A loss of participants from the initial population can be justified with each
iteration from this procedure.
The Delphi process has undergone many changes since it has been developed by
the Rand Corporation (Sackman, 1974). The revised Delphi used in this study was a
modified methodology technique which is interjected to further structure the group
process. For example: (a) it brings the participants physically together; (b) it
incorporates formal instruction to the participants in group processes and methods of
consensus; (c) it provides and facilitate group exercise in group processes; (d) it
utilizes anonymous individual written data as a basis for group deliberations; and (e) it
uses group facilitators to guide group interaction and maintain focus toward the Delphi
goals. The Delphi process will rely heavily on direct interaction between the
facilitators and the SME's. This approach is selected primarily because of the
objectives and the requirement to maintain a high level of focus for the group
consensus.

Unlike other evolutions of the Delphi technique, this methodology relies heavily
on direct interaction between the facilitators and the participants. It requires an
interactive approach to generate the data base. All participants are provided training
before data development procedures are initiated. Participants are briefed on the
purpose of the work shop, its goals and use of all data. Confidentiality of the
individual data is assured during the briefing. Given the nature of the population of
interest, additional training was provided thru a background briefing during the initial
hours of the first day of the workshop. Included with this training are concepts in
group dynamics, group think, bias, consensus development, leadership, and
psychological traits and abilities, that familiarize the individuals of the roles and rules
they are expected to follow to ensure a successful workshop. This technique was
utilized primarily because of the complexity of the objectives and the requirement to
maintain a high level of concentration for the group consensus.
Design:
Because of the complexity of the issues immersed and the limited time available
to conduct the workshops, numerous materials were developed and distributed prior to
beginning each Delphi. The process involved putting together a pre-Delphi workshop
packet, that was to be given to each SME 3-4 days before the workshop commenced,
and was to be used as a guide during the two day workshops procedures (see
APPENDIX A). The pre-Delphi workshop packet materials essentially outlined the
workshop schedule, briefly described the necessary group processes panorama, and
defined the focal issues of the Delphi. In addition, the pre-Delphi workshop packet
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was a description of the overall research project. A cover letter conveying appreciation
for the SME participation ad detailing logistical information was also included (see
APPENDIX B). The SME's were instructed to review these materials before the
workshop began.
The pre-workshop packets provided a starting point for each individual SME.
The pre-workshop packets were color-coded to direct participants to each of the tasks
described above (e.g., "First look over the PINK AGENDA to become familiar with*
the workshop sequence."). Each of the tasks also indicated an estimated amount of
time it would take to complete the individual task. All rating scales were simple five or
seven point structured likert scales with textual anchor points (see APPENDIX A).
Participants enjoyed the freedom to respond to the objectives with only broadly defined
goals. The workshop objective are displayed in APPENDIX C.
In order to establish a foundation for group work on the Delphi issues, the
SME's were furnished item pools of factors that were related to the issues. This
material was intended to facilitate and guide the inputs on the three major issues (of
which the last two are utilized for this Thesis). The SME's were instructed to read the
complete pre-workshop packet and individually identify and add or delete to the list to
the provided {screenerpreselected list) of the reasons why people enjoy or stay on the
job; individually identify and add or delete to the list provided Screener preselected
list) of the reasons why people do not like the job or quit. After considering both lists,
the SME's were to individually suggest what can be done to improve the job, make it
more enjoyable and satisfying, or how the pay and reward system can be made better,

and what is needed to be changed to help people stay on the job. This list of factors
were to impact career retention and job satisfaction (see APPENDIX A). Most of the
individual items were derived by comments from screeners and supervisors. It is
important to note that no attempt was made to be comprehensive. The material was to
facilitate discussion and reflection on the specific issue.
There were two major reasons for offering initial data to the SME's. First, this
procedure was to accomplish the objectives of the Delphi process within a rigorous •
time period. Screeners and supervisors are operational personnel and their services are
required to maintain adequate staffing at the security checkpoints. A lengthy research
protocol would interfere with personnel scheduling. As noted before levels of turnover
are abnormally high within airport security companies and utilizing a core group of
personnel for a lengthy period of time would impact both the manpower and, thus, the
overall security of the airport. This study, consequently, was a descriptive method
that determined and derived the job satisfiers and motivators in terms of a reason why
screeners try or want to stay on the job; and the job dissatisfiers in terms of reasons to
dislike the job or quit.
Procedures:

Each Delphi workshop was conducted identically using a four-stage process.
SME's were guided through: a) an introductory stage; b) group process training; c)
preparatory stage; and d) Delphi process stage. The initial two stages were only given
before the first issue was to begin to eliminate redundant training and overview
information. The workshop had four facilitators present to make sure the SME's
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stayed focused to the goals of the workshop. They provided an open comfortable
atmosphere so that each participant could be of impact and equality in the consensus of
each goal.
In the introduction to the workshop there was a welcome and introduction of
participants and staff. The participants were then briefed on the project overview. For
example: the purpose, the goals and use of all data, sincere interest in the FAA,
appreciation for their expertise, convey the facilitators role and the basic concepts ofe
the Delphi workshop. Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of the data
and the value of using the participants as subject matter experts. Confidentiality of the
individual data was assured during the introduction briefing and throughout the
workshop. It was made sure that everyone understood that they would only know their
individual ratings and the group mean. Every effort was made to convey to the
participants that they were the experts and only they, as a group, had the knowledge of
the job satisfiers and dissatisfiers that were necessary to want to stay or leave the job.
The facilitators further explained that the reasons and motivation to remain in the career
field required close examination, and had thus far been an mystery to the research
team. The Delphi process was presented and emphasized as a team effort, and that a
cooperative and open interaction was necessary among and between participants and
facilitators.
During the introductory stage of the workshop, participants completed a preworkshop survey and a background/biographical form (see APPENDIX A). The preworkshop survey assessed initial attitudes and expectations about the workshop process,

whereas the biographical data focused on related job experience factors (e.g., time at
the current job, length of time with the company, position, and X-ray systems used).
Both surveys had self-contained instructions. All returned forms were assigned a code
and placed into a database by a single facilitator as the process continued by the other
facilitators, thus conserving valued time. The codes were to ensure the SME's
anonymity. The introductory stage concluded with the dispersement of administrative
and logistical information (e.g., background forms, payment vouchers, and room

.

locations to be used in the airport during study). This initial stage ordinarily took 60
minuets for completion.
The group process stage was initiated after a short break period. Additional
training was provided that familiarized the SME participants with the methods of group
processes. Included with this training are concepts in group dynamics, the recognition
and avoidance of group think phenomena, bias, consensus development, leadership,
psychological traits and abilities. Group interaction techniques were the spotlight of
this stage. All material was presented using a combination of lecture, class room type
question and answer, media presentations, and demonstrations.
The first objective (not utilized for this thesis) (i.e., personality items and
abilities) was in actuality a practice and/or training exercise, since the scientific
literature does not bear much weight on personality tests as accurate performance
predictors. This training exercise was a pertinent foundation for the following issues to
be presented. The next two objectives were viewed imperative to the airport
checkpoint security screeners occupation. The objectives were a list of job satisfiers

and motivators, and a list of reasons to dislike their job or quit (these lists are all job
satisfiers, motivators, reasons to dislike or quit that were given from airport security
checkpoint screeners) (refer to APPENDIX C). Participants were re-assured that the
facilitators were not part of the group and would guide the process during group
interaction. Considerable effort was directed to guarantee that all participants felt
comfortable with the process. This stage of the process averaged about 60 minuets for
completion.
The preparatory stage began with a review of the objectives, goals, and
individual responsibilities. The bulk of this stage, however, centered around
presentation and clarification of the issues. The facilitators re-emphasized how the data
is obtained and used. The SME's were informed that individual evaluations of the
items are required for the next stage of the process. The SME's were briefed on the
intangible framework of each technique. With the assistance of a facilitator, a selection
of a scaling technique that is best suited for the follow-on evaluations were chosen.
Scale values will be dependent on the technique selected. The data and the data's uses
was reiterated to ensure that both small groups and the bringing together of the large
jjroup completely for consensus completely understood the value of their contribution
and to assist in providing a clear focus to the group process. Instructions for group
work were clarified with particular attention devoted to the comprehension of the
concepts underlying the likert scales that would be utilized in the judgement
evaluations. The difference between judging items and ratings was repeated to review
specific reference to the distributed item pools and likert scales.
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Once the facilitators responded to all questions and concerns, the SME's were
released to begin their small group work. The intact Delphi group was separated into
two small groups, these two groups were isolated into two different rooms in their
respective airports. Since adequate numbers of SME's were available at each site, two
intact groups were assembled to function independently. The separation was devised to
facilitate in-depth exploration of the objectives and forthcoming issues. Establishment
of two independent databases provided a means to conduct split-half reliability analysis.
Small groups had either five or seven members and were assigned from the larger intact
group by the facilitators and station managers in order to avoid any personality
conflicts, bias, and to keep friendship relationships or supervisor/screener relationships
from keeping everyone in the group from being equal. The preparatory stage averaged
30 minutes to complete.
The final stage of the Delphi process re-convenes the group to develop
consensus on the importance of individual items with each content area. This stage was
the predominate component of the work group sessions. SME's were initially tasked to
work in a small group setting, and were provided an item pool for each of the Delphi
precincts that addressed the issues of job retention and attrition factors (concerning the
areas which would make a screener want to stay on the job or leave the job). Several
scaling options are presented to the group. The data then was accumulated and
provided to the group as feedback and as basis for group discussion and consensus.
The SME's were briefed that their individual data and their judgement ratings were
collapsed and presented to the small work group anonymously to use in group

discussion. Individual inputs are not identified within this feedback only their own
initial evaluations and the group mean for each item. Participants were free to input
new concepts, review, modify existing ideas, delete items, and prepare commentary for
each item pool where they saw fit. There were no restrictions placed on extending the
item pools. The initial factors were a compendium of initial factors that were
developed from screener and supervisor comments. While reviewing and extending the
qualitative content of the item pools, SME's were also asked to reach consensus as asmall group and scale each of the items by evaluating them for importance. The
SME's were addressed several fundamental areas before they were allowed to begin
their work. These were: (a) SME's were ensured that the item pools were only an
initial starting point, and that it was decisive for them to add or modify the items based
on their own unique perceptions; (b) SME input and their comprehensiveness of the
item pools was the most important facet of the workshop; (c) facilitators re-iterated
that all individual data, both qualitative and quantitative, were combined and presented
to the group as grouped data without individual identification; (d) the SME's were
briefed that the small group consensus data would be the basis for further intact group
work, and that it would be beneficial for them to maintain private notes to use during
the intact group discussions; (e) the SME's were briefed on the job of the facilitator,
including time management and their roles.
The initial focus of the work groups was to extend the item pool through
facilitated exploration of the issues. Individual input was encouraged to clarify and
modify each item as necessary. The facilitators promoted group discussion by
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challenging or provoking inquiry into the ratings provided for each item. Through this
open process of iteration and structured reflection and thought, the item pool and
individual item ratings were modified. This led to the development of an intact group
consensus from the two smaller work groups.
The SME's and facilitators reconvened to conduct the intact group process
work. The initial input to the intact group process work was computer generated
(Lotus 123) and evaluations compiled from both of the small groups. Once consensus
was consummated within the individual small groups, all participants were reconvened
into the larger intact group. This process generated the finalized item pool and
evaluations for each Delphi. These data would later be collapsed across all Delphi's
and be retained as the foundation for the survey. The survey would be utilized to
extend the generalizations of the findings and allow a more diverse input to the
research. Typically this process requires three to six hours for completion and is
dependent on the complexity and size of the database. The process generates an
extensive and exhaustive item pool.
The Delphi workshops concluded with SME's completing two post-workshop
surveys, then a question and answer debriefing was held to further gather any concerns
the screeners had with the Delphi workshops. A group process survey of seven items,
using a 5-point scale (see APPENDIX A), required participants to evaluate the group
process with respect to goal clarity, group relationships, resource management, and
decision-making processes. The second workshop assessment survey asked participants
to evaluate workshop products (see APPENDIX A). SME's evaluated satisfaction with
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the workshop, effectiveness of feedback, and personal contribution to the process. This
helped provide feedback to the facilitators.
Analysis
The Delphi workshops had thirty-four screeners participate from two security
companies (Argenbright, and ITS). Of those 34, 14 were supervisors (41%) and the
other 59% were screeners. Twenty-one were female (62%) and 13 (38%) were male.
The screeners "time at current job" ranged from 6-168 months (Mean = 34.9 months;
and the standard deviation = 31.7 months) and "time with company" ranged from 11168 months (mean = 42.8 months; and the standard deviation = 34.2 months) (see
APPENDIX D).
All screeners (N = 34) were grouped into six categories by 12-month increments.
This was done for simplistics of getting an overall rating of screeners on the job in one
year increments. A histogram showing the number of months employed (i.e., time at
current job) is shown in Figure 7. All screeners who participated in the delphi (as
mentioned previously) have completed the ATA-approaved training course and were
consisered to be a good-to-superior screener by their company.
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Frequency Distribution of Participants by
Number of Months Employed at Current Job
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Figure 7. Frequency Distribution of Participants by Number
of Months Employed at Current Job.

Pre-Workshop Survey
This section consisted of six questions inquiring about screeners' opinions and
attitudes toward the workshop and fellow co-workers. Screeners responded on a sevenpoint scale with anchors varying from question to question. A figure is exhibited for
each of the six questions that were asked to the screeners in the Pre-Workshop Survey.
The figures illustrate the frequency of screener responses. APPENDIX E presents the
data from the Pre-Workshop Survey in tabular format.
Question 1 asked screeners to rate their job skills and understanding comparable
to their fellow co-workers. Ratings ranged from (Very Highly Skilled = 1) to (No Skill
= 7). The mode was 2 and the median was 2 which signified that the majority of the
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screeners felt very skillful in understanding and evaluating the job as compared to their
fellow workers. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is
shown in Figure 8.
1. As a pre-board x-ray screener (in this group of screeners), my skills in
understanding and evaluating the job put me about here, relative to the
others.

Question 1
50°/c

10%
0%

l l l
III
1

2

Very Highly
Skilled

3

4
5
Skill Level

7
No Skill
At All

Measure of Central Tendency
Mode = 2
Median = 2

Figure 8. Frequency Distribution of Screeners* Responses to
Pre-Workshop Question 1.

Question 2 asked for a rating of how screeners felt their ideas would be
accepted by their co-workers. Rating ranged from (Yes, absolutely = 7) to (No, not at
all). The mode was 2 and median was 3 indicating that the majority of screeners were
confident that their ideas were in agreement with fellow workers. The frequency
histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 9.

2. I think my ideas will be in agreement with the rest of the screeners
in the group.

Question 2
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Figure 9. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' responses to
Pre-Workshop Question 2.

Question 3 asked for a rating of how well screeners knew their fellow coworkers. Ratings ranged from (Yes, pretty much =1) to (No, none at all = 7).
The mode was 1 and the median was 2 indicating that most of the screeners knew their
fellow workers well. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this
item is shown in Figure 10).

3. I know most of the screeners very well.

Figure 10. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Pre-Workshop Question 3.

Question 4 asked for a rating of screeners' knowledge of the necessary skills
and abilities required for successful performance as a screener. Ratings ranged from
(Yes, lots = 1) to (No none = 7). The mode was 2 and the median was 2 indicating
that most of the screeners know what the required skills and abilities are for success as
a screener. The frequency histogram of the seven posssible ratings for this item is
shown in Figure 11.

4. I have some definite ideas about what the necessary skills and abilities
are for success as a screener.

Question 4
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Figure 11. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Pre-Workshop Question 4.

Question 5 asked for a rating of screeners' experience relative to others
participating in the workshop. Ratings ranged from (Yes = 1) to (No = 7). The
mode was 2 and the median was 2 indicating that there was a variety of experience
levels present at the workshops. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings
for this item is shown in Figure 12.

5. I have been in airport screening longer than most of the other
screeners here.
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Firure 12. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Pre-Workshop Question 5.

Question 6 asked for a rating of the screeners' perceptions as to what the
workshop will accomplish. Ratings ranged from (Yes, I think it will be = 1) to (No, I
think it may be a waste of time = 7). The mode was 1 and the median 1 indicating
that the majority of the screeners felt the workshop would be successful and worth
while. The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in
Figure 13.
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6. I am anticipating that the workshop is going to be a good
experience and will accomplish what we need to do.

Question 6
70%
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Yes, I think
it will be

Measure of Central Tendency:
Mode = 1
Median = 1

3
4
5
Anticipation

No, I think it
may be a waste
of time

Figure 13. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' responses to
Pre-Workshop Question 6.

Workshop Objectives
This section of the survey was divided into three parts. The first part
(personality items and abilities of successful screeners) is not included in this Thesis
due to the fact that it does not reflect the attrition and rentenion problems that plague
the aviation security industry today. The other two sections (job satisfiers and
motivators, and reasons to dislike the job or quit) are included as beneficial facets to
this Thesis. Several items were presented in this part of the workshop ( a total of 65
items in all). The airport checkpoint security screeners rated each item by their level of
perceived importance according to their respective 5-point scale. A table was generated
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from these data for the two objectives portraying the intact group rating by site. It
should be noted that in each of the following tables for the two objectives, the data was
collected and then analyzed, and are presented in order of perceived importance. They
are not in the order in which they were presented to the screeners during the
workshops.
The majority of the workshop was spent discussing these two objectives to reach
a small group consensus and then ultimately an intact group consensus. To achieve this
consensus particular attention was placed on the item meaning (i.e., how the group
defined the word). This was essential in many cases before evaluating the individual
items. In some instances, for example, item lists were modified to include new items
not part of the original list, and, screeners might have merged other items or collapsed
the item to systematically eliminate redundancies, whereas other items were deleted,
indicated by an It, because of their obscurity, ambiguity, or irrelevance.
Job Satisfiers and Motivators
Job satisfiers and motivators asked each screener to rate each item in terms of "a
reason why I try to/want to stay on the job." ratings ranged from (1 = Absolutely
Unnecessary) to (5 = Absolutely Necessary). Those factors that appear to have a
serious impact on career retention and attrition factors, and job satisfaction were rated a
[5], whereas those rated a [1] or [2] were viewed as not nearly as important (see Table
5).
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Tabled. Job Satisfiers and Motivators - Intact Group Ratings by
Level of Perceived Importance (N = 34).
Job Satisfiers
and
Motivators
• \

<%

<.

MCO
Intact
Rating
<n = 14)

SFO
Intact
Rating
(n = 10)

JFK
Intact
Rating
<n = 10)
:

• " <

••••.•

* *

1. Medical benefits

5.0

5.0

5.0

2. Retirement benefits

5.0

5.0

4.5

3. Appreciation "by** supervisors

X

4.0

5.0

4. Importance of the work I do

4.0

5.0

4.0

5. Desire to protect people

5.0

4.0

4.0

6. Pride in my work

5.0

4.0

4.0

7. Flexible hours and days

4.5

4.0

4.0

8. The hours of the job (the shift work)

4.0

4.0

It

9. Appriciation "of" supervisors

4.0

4.0

4.0 •

10. Opportunities for rewards

3.0

4.0

5.0

11. Enjoyment of helping people

3.5

4.0

4.0

12. High responsibility of the lob

3.0

4.0

4.0

13. Comfortable place to work

3.0

4.0

4.0

14. Good general work experience

3.0

4.0

4.0

15. Wages job pays

5.0

4.0

2.0

16. Being around people

3.0

4.0

4.0

17. Job is challenging

3.0

4.0

4.0

18. Wanted to learn something new

3.0

4.0

4.0

19. Like working with co-workers (companionship)

3.0

3.5

4.0

20. Doing airport security work

*

4.0

3.0

21. Enjoy being busy

3.0

4.0

3.0

22. Thrill of finding targets

2.0

4.0

4.0

23. Wanted to work in airports

4.0

3.0

3.0

24. Recognition by company

1.0

4.0

5.0

25. Fast pace of the job

2.5

4.0

It

26. Want to stop terrorist acts

1.5

4.0

4.0

27. Chance to move into supervisory positions

2.0

4.0

3.0

28. Others think my iob is important

3.0

3.0

It

29. Potential job contacts

2.0

3.0

4.0

30. Makes a good second job

3.0

2.0

4.0

31. Dislike other jobs that were available

2.5

1.0

5.0

32. Difficulty of the job

2.0

3.0

It

33. Doing a iob few others can do

1.0

4.0

It

34. My family thinks the job is important

1.5

4.0

2.0

35. Appreciation "from" manager

1.0

4.0

It

36. Enjoy controlling people

2.0

1.0

4.0

37. Job is easy

1.5

2.0

3.0

38. To make friends

1.5

2.0

3.0

39. Opportunity to find weapons

1.5

2.0

It

;
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Dissatisfiers and Dislikes
Dissatisfiers and Dislikes asked screeners to rate each item that "best represents
your feeling about why people quit and/or dislike being a screener." Ratings ranged
from (1 = No effect what-so-ever) to (5 = Major reason). Many factors were rated
either [4] or [5] indicating that this item is of "important" or a "major reason" for
leaving the occupation (see Table 6).
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lahieJi. Job Dissatisfiers and Dislikes - Intact Group Ratings by
Level of Perceived Importance (N = 34).
MCO
Intact
Rating
(n = 14)

JFK
Intact
Rating
(n = 10)

SFO
Intact
Rating
(n=10)

1. Poor Pay

5.0

5.0

5.0

2. Little or no medical benefits

5.0

5.0

5.0

3. Found "better" iob

5.0

5.0

5.0

4. Too much work for amount of pay

5.0

4.5

5.0

p. No longer need second iob

5.0

4.0

It

I!
II
||

Job Dissatisfiers
and
Dislikes

6. No retirement program

5.0

4.0

4.0

[7. Doing job temporarily to earn extra money

4.0

4.0

5.0

8. Criticism by supervisors

4.0

4.0

5.0

9. Stressful

4.5

5.0

3.0*

10. No opportunities for advancement

4.5

4.0

4.0

11. Not told upfront what to expect

5.0

4.0

3.0

12. Supervisor problems

3.5

4.0

It

13. Job is causing physical discomfort

4.0

4.0

3.0

14. Afraid to make a mistake or be wrong

3.0

4.0

4.0

15. Management not listening to suggestions and/or complaints

2.0

4.0

5.0

16. Not apprreciated

4.5

4.0

2.0

17. Passenger hostility

4.0

4.0

2.0

18. Job was not what I thought it was

4.5

2.0

3.0

19. Job is too difficult

4.0

2.5

3.0

20. Having to work holidays

3.0

4.0

2.0

21. I do not find job important

1.5

2.0

5.0

[22. Hard to get to work

2.0

4.0

2.0

23. Dislike co-workers

3.0

2.0

3.0

24. Fear of finding weapons

2.0

4.0

2.0

25. Work is tiring and exhausting

3.0

3.0

2.0

26. Not being kept abreast of what's going on

2.0

3.0

3.0

27. Working with passengers

2.0

3.0

It

28. Family and/or spouse wants me to quit

2.5

3.0

2.0

29. Confronting passengers

2.5

3.0

2.0

30. Decisions have to made to fast

2.5

3.0

2.0

31. Job is not challenging

2.5

2.0

It

32. Dislike hours

3.5

1.0

2.0

33. Do not like working weekends

2.5

4.0

2.0

34. Job is boring

2.0

2.0

2.0

35. Job is too fast paced

2.0

2.0

2.0

36. Breaks/lunch time not enough

1.0

3.0

2.0

37. Don't want to work in airports

1.5

2.0

2.0

38. Not appreciated by company

*
*

*
*

3.0

39. Criticism by supervisors
r^"®^
'>
,
>

*

1

4.0
*

• "

[

s"
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Post-Workshop Survey
This part of the survey was administered at the end of each Delphi workshop. It focused
on group goals and was divided into two sections: a) process and b) products. The data
is presented in tabular format (see APPENDIX F, process; APPENDIX G, products) and
afigureis shown for each of the seven questions. Thefiguresportray thefrequencyof the
screeners' responses.
Group Goals w Process
The Group Goals -Process section embodied seven questions where screeners
responded on afive-pointscale with acnhors varyingfromquestion to question. Question
1 asked the screeners to rate the clarity of their group's goals. Ratings rangedfrom(No
apparent goals = 1) to (Goals very clear = 5). The mode was 4 and the median was 4
indicating that the majority of screeners felt the group goals were very distinct. The
frequency histogram of thefivepossible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 1.

Question 2 asked screeners to rate how much trust and openness was in their
group Ratings ranged from (Distrust = 1) to (Strong trust and openness = 5). The mode
was 4 and the median was 4 indicating that their was much trust and openness in the
groups. The frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in
Figure 15.
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2. How much trust and openness in the group?
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Figure 15. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' responses to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 2.

Question 3 asked screeners to rate how sensitive and aware were the group
members during the process Ratings ranged from (No awareness or listening in the group
= 1) to (Outstanding sensitivity and awareness to others = 5) The mode was 4 and the
median was 4 indicating that the sensitivity and awareness of the group members was
slightly better than average The frequency of the five possible ratings for this item is
shown in Figure 16
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Figure 16. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 3.

Question 4 asked screeners to rate how group leadership needs were met Ratings
ranged from (Not met, drifting =1) to (Everyone helped lead the group = 5). The mode
was 5 and the median 5 indicating that the leadership functions were evenly distributed
among group members The frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item
is shown in Figure 17

4. How were group leadership needs met?
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Figure 17. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responces to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 4.

Question 5 asked screeners to rate how group decisions were made. Ratings
ranged from (No decisions could be reached = 1) to (Full participation and consensus =
5) The mode was 4 and the median was 4 indicating that the groups made considerable
attempts to look at all points of view and participate while coming to consensus The
frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 18
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Figure 18. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 5.

Question 6 asked screeners to rate how well the group resources were used.
Ratings ranged from (One or two contributed =1) to (Individual opinions were fully and
effectively used = 5) The mode was 4 and the median was 4 indicating that the groups
utilized all resources well and encouraged different opinions The frequency histogram of
the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 19
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Figure 19. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 6.

Question 7 asked screeners to rate how much loyalty and sense of belonging there
was in each group Ratings ranged from (Members had no group loyality or sense of
belonging =1) to (Strong sense of belonging among members = 5) The mode was 5 and
the median was 5 indicating that there was a strong sence of belonging in the groups The
frequency histogram of the five possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 20
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7. How much loyalty and sense of belonging to the group?

Question 7
60%

X 10°
0%
Members had no 1
group loyality or
sense of belonging

Measure of Central Tendency
Mode = 5
Median = 5

2
3
4
Loyalty /Belonging

Strong sense of
belonging among
members

Figure 20. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Process" Question 7.

Group Goals - Products
This section consisted of seven questions where screeners responded on a sevenpoint scale with anchors varying from question to question (see APPENDIX E for
Products' Questions Screener Responses). Question 1 asked screeners to rate their
satisfaction with the workshop Ratings ranged from (I feel satisfied with the results = 1)
to (I'm not really happy with the results at all = 7) The mode was 1 and the median was 2
indicating that most of the screeners were exceptionally satisfied with the workshop
results The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in
Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 1.

Question 2 asked screeners to rate their opinion about lessons learned from the
various feedback. Ratings ranged from (I learned ideas from the feedback = 1) to (I didn't
learn a thing from the feedback = 7). The mode was 1 and the median 1 indicating that the
majority of the screeners learned various ideas from the feedback. The frequency
histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 22
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Figure 22. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 2.

Question 3 asked screeners to rate whether or not each screener agreed with the
ideas in the feedback Ratings ranged from (I agree with the ideas in the feedback = 1) to
(I disafreed with everything in the feedback = 7) The mode was 1 and the median was 2
indicating that the majority of the screeners agreed with the ideas in the feedback The
frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 3.

Question 4 asked screeners to rate their opinion on how easy it was to express
their ideas Ratings ranged from (I could express my ideas OK this way = 1) to (I could
not really say what I wanted to say = 7). The mode was 1 and the median was 1
indicating that most of the screeners had little difficulty expressing their ideas and
opinions The frequency histogram of the seven possible ratings for this item is shown in
Figure 24.
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Figure 24. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 4.

Question 5 asked screeners to rate their willingness to speak during the workshop
Ratings ranged from (I feel as if I really wanted to talk to people = 1) to (I did not feel the
need to talk at all = 7). The mode was 1 and the median was 1 indicating that most of the
screeners had no problems discussing their thoughts The frequency histogram of the
seven possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 25
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Figure 25. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 5.

Question 6 asked screeners to rate their opinion on how well the group understood
their viewpoint Ratings ranged from (I have a feeling people did not understand or think
about my reasons = 1) to (I think people understood my reasons pretty well = 7) The
mode was 6 and the median 6 indicating that many of the screeners felt comfortable with
how well the group understood their viewpoint The frequency histogram of the seven
possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 26

Figure26. Frequency Distribution of Screeners' Responses to
Post-Workshop "Products" Question 6.

Question 7 asked screeners to rate the speed at which ideas and topics were
discussed. Ratings ranged from (I think it went to quickly = 1) to (I think it went to
slowly = 7). The mode was 2 and the median was 2 indicating that the majority of the
screeners felt the workshop went fairly quick The frequency histogram of the seven
possible ratings for this item is shown in Figure 27.
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98
Conclusions and Recommendations
General Findings
The most striking general observation that can be seen in the data is the relatively
similarfindingsfound across all three facilities. Thisfindingis important in that all three
facilities are widely different in the cultural and ethnic backgrounds of the workforce, and
the facilities are geographically dispersed. Additionally, the facilities are operated by
different securityfirmswith different policies and procedures. Thesefindingsare
encouraging as they indicate the sources ofjob satisfaction and dissatisfaction are related
specifically to the nature of the job vice being attributed to the demographic biases within
the workforce (i.e., relative time it takes airport security checkpoint screeners at JFK to
get to work versus airport security checkpoint screeners at MCO or SFO).
From an organizational viewpoint, the data supports the development of
interventions that can be applied industry-wide. Interventions that are directed toward
improving job satisfaction while mitigating or eliminating the causes ofjob dissatisfaction
would be expected to enjoy similar degrees of success regardless of the facility. This
significantly simplifies the development of intervention programs because it avoids the
requirement of tailoring the programs to be site specific. If the site can adjust to the needs
of the screener there probably will be a screener who is satisfied with the job and
committed to the job. Such an approach aids the evaluation process of the effectiveness of
the implemented programs, as well, by allowing a comparison of performance of facilities
(i.e., turnover rates, job satisfaction, inventories) both with and without intervention
programs applied. A comparison of the individual effectiveness of intervention techniques
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can also be achieved by differentially applying the techniques among facilities. Perhaps the
government stepping in to lead this approach would intermittently aid all contractors and
all airlines equally.
The Delphi workshop facilitators remarked about the level of enthusiasm and
enjoyment expressed by the participants. There was a feeling shared among the facilitators
that the workshop was a great success and how the workshop had a uniform flow. The
author was amazed of the amount of information that was shared, expressed, and cameto
successful consensus. The determination of the screeners to come to a clear consensus on
each issue and the sincerity of the screeners to better their job environment were distinct
features that were present during the workshop.
It was also interesting to note that although there were 34 airport security
checkpoint screeners each having their own different personalities, input was optimally
shared from all participants while equally minimizing distinctive differences. The success
was eminent by the clarity of the interaction between the facilitators and the participants
(the quality of the data is contingent upon how effective the group members inter-relate).
It is for this reason that post-workshop surveys that assess both process and product
dimensions were conducted. The pre-workshop survey was also conducted as a means to
view what preconceived expectations the participants had, and to give them a feel for what
was to come. Furthermore, it was also obvious that the training at the beginning of the
workshop on the concepts of group dynamics, group think, bias, consensus development,
leadership, and psychological traits and abilities, that familiarized the individuals of the

roles and rules that they were expected to follow was an excellent guide to aid in the
requirement to maintain a high level of concentration for the group consensus.
The degree of appreciation demonstrated by the screener participants at the
conclusion of all workshops was sincere and explicitly indicated the success of the
workshop process. Post workshop data presented in Figure 21 (page 91) and personnel
letters of feed back written to the author (see Text Box 1) convincingly support these
observations.

Text Box 1, Follow up Letter from Mrs. Ferrell (SME, JFK)

"Mr.

Mark St. Laurent

Let me start by thanking you and your staff once
again, for that two day session. It really felt good to
have someone listen to our grief, being able to speak
honestly and openly was a great release...Thanks for you
and your staffs consideration. I hope that your input
can change some of these things"
Mrs. Ferrell

The Delphi process was conducted, in part, for the purpose of identifying and
evaluating the factors that lead to an employee leaving his/her job. In this regard, the
process was productive in identifying issues that interventions could be directed toward.
The Delphi process was not used, nor would it have been appropriate to use, as a means
to develop solutions to problems. A word of caution is also advised in reviewing the data.
The factors that were identified may not be individually responsible as a reason for leaving

employment, but must be acknowledged as a set of satisfiers and dissatisfiers with relative
valences. A decision to quit a job is a complex one that may include any number of
consideration factors. The intact group consensus values are also just that, they are a
product of group consensus and are an agreement among participants. An individual's
personal decision may weigh these factors differently depending on their own
circumstances and other available options.
Post-Workshop Survey - Process
The process survey indicated that participants had positive perceptions regarding
all aspects of the Delphi process including goal clarity, group openness and sensitivity,
group decision making and shared leadership, and group loyalty. Process evaluations
were consistently toward the extreme positive range of the scale with little variance
between facilities or within groups. Six of the seven process ratings exceeded 4.0 on the
5-point scale with the variance never exceeding 25 percent of the mean after the data was
collapsed across all three facilities. An additionalfindingof interest is the consistent trend
toward more positive evaluations across the three facilities when viewed in chronological
order in which they were conducted. This probably reflects the increasing level of
experience of the facilitators. As the facilitators become more comfortable with their roles
and refine their skills, facilitation of the group process was more effective.

Post-Workshop Survey - Products
The post-workshop survey regarding workshop products was also very
encouraging. Of the seven factors evaluated,fivewere rated toward the extreme positive
anchor of the 7-point scale. Participants were very positive about the results, feedback,
capability to express ideas, and the willingness to communicate during the workshop.
Although rated moderately positive, participants were comparatively less positive
regarding their perception of how well other screeners understood their ideas. This in
effect could have been a factor of the amount of time there was to discuss each individual
topic with additional examples. Again, it is important to note, that there was a trend
toward more positive ratings across facilities when view in chronological order. Most
notable is with regard to the pace that the workshop proceeded. The initial workshop was
perceived as moving too quickly, but with the second and third Delphi workshops the
ratings for the pace of the process progressively were rated close to the ideal.
Thesis Objectives in Workshop
Two issues need to be addressed before examining the data. First, participants
evaluated these factors with regard to their importance for the future, future expectations,
and outlook of their jobs. At the time this work was conducted, medical and retirement
benefits were usually nonexistent or only minimally provided for by the union (e.g.,
medical benefits for JFK screeners). Wages as a standard were at minimum wage or
within 25 percent of the federal minimum for screeners and only slightly higher for
supervisor personnel. Cash rewards for identifying FAA targets or actual targets were
only of a token nature ($25 to $50) and were infrequent. Two screeners at two separate
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sites noted that they were promised cash rewards for their detection of a target, and to this
day have never been rewarded. Many of the screeners admitted to never have seen a
reward given to a screener for a successful detection. However, many airport checkpoint
screeners outspokenly admitted that the airlines and the security companies were quick to
administer negative penalties to fellow workers for missing a target. The literature
strongly suggests that negative reinforcement of this nature is a good way to increase
unwanted employee turnover. On rare occasions, small gratuities were received from
passengers for an extra service provided (e.g., transporting a handicapped passenger from
one concourse to another or helping an elderly woman with here luggage across the
airport). Participants therefore evaluated these issues as the way they would like to see
them rather than as they currently exist.
The second major issue that needs to be addressed before examining the data is the
relationship of these factors to one another. The job satisfiers and the job dissatisfiers
both had a unidimensional effect towards the participants. Medical and retirement benefits
were considered more crucial than wages and the opportunity for rewards as motivators to
remain on the job. This is probably do to the considerable increase in public attention
given to both health care and the status of the social security system (i.e., retirement), or
do to the fact that the majority of the screeners were aware of the high cost of medical
treatment and have families to support. Regardless of the source of concern, the airport
security checkpoint screeners valued medical and retirement benefits more than monetary
compensation. This is not easily differentiated from the data due to the limitations of the
scale values used.
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This discussion was provided to heighten the awareness of the reader to the issues
beyond compensation. It is important to keep in mind Herzbergs' views (and other
researchers) on the categories of motivators that accomplish satisfaction and
dissatisfaction when reviewing the data. This will ultimately help put ideas and findings
into perspective. The hygiene needs which prevent dissatisfaction and the feelings of
achievement, recognition for accomplishment, challenging work, increased responsibility,
and growth and development that produce job satisfaction. A comparison and contrast of
Hertzberg's motivators along with the Delphi workshop conclusions give a good
prospective of research methods that have been studied throughout the past few decades
and relate them to the current findings on satisfiers and dissatisfiers found among airport
security checkpoint personnel.
Satisfaction and Motivation
The proficiency and effectiveness of retention and attrition factors can be achieved
and evaluated by focusing upon employee job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction. Data
generated by the Delhi workshops for purposes of this Thesis focused on the issues: (a)
job satisfiers and motivators; and (b) reasons to dislike job or quit. Literature strongly
suggests that there are parallel relationships between job satisfiers and dislikes that impact
a security checkpoint screeners decisions to stay on, or leave the job. Interesting findings
from this study on job satisfiers and motivators that are noteworthy and contribute to
career retention for airport security checkpoint screeners can be classified into several
categories: (a) compensation/benefits; (b) social/intrinsic; (c) job convenience factors;
and (d) recognition. Unlike Herzberg, all the factors involved in producing job satisfaction
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were not separate and distinctfromall the factors that prompted job dissatisfaction. In
fact, many of the issues that came to consensus were contributors to both job satisfaction
and job dissatisfaction. Within each of the four categories of motivators, several factors
were consistently rated as absolutely necessary or job dissatisfaction would increase and
job satisfaction would decrease. Not surprisingly, medical benefits, retirement benefits,
and wages were all evaluated as major compensation/benefit contributors (related to
Herzberg's hygiene factors) that contributed to both job satisfaction and job
dissatisfaction. The opportunity for rewards (e.g., FAA and authentic targets),
achievement and recognition were consistent motivational factors in producing job
satisfaction. It is important to note Lawler and Jenkins (1992) in that the kind and level of
rewards an organization offers influence who is attracted to work for an organization and
more importantly who will continue to work for it. These factors received among the
highest evaluations of the 32 factors identified as contributing to job satisfaction (see
APPENDIX D).
Social and intrinsic motivators and satisfiers were also found to contribute
considerably to the checkpoint screener remaining on the job. Like Hertzberg's theory, it
was also found that the nature and purpose of the airport checkpoint screener jobs offered
strong determinants of job satisfaction. Most importantly, airport checkpoint security
personnel found considerable gratification in the importance of their work, were very
proud of the work they perform, and had a true desire to protect people. To the
participants, these motivators were nearly as important to job satisfaction as compensation
and benefits, thus, providing the information that can lead to better satisfaction and

fulfillment on the job. The participants in the Delphi workshops noted that if the security
companies matched these needs with the job itself the outcome would be a security
screener who is satisfied with the job and committed to the job. As a result the airport
security checkpoint personnel will call in sick less, be less likely to leave the job, and will
produce higher quality work (i.e., better detection rates). These goals all add up. For the
security screener it means a satisfied work environment and for the company (both the
security company and the airline) it means higher profits. If a security screeners needs are
not satisfied by the job itself, they will end up frustrated (as clearly noted by the delphi
workshop and seen by the high turnover rates) and either will quit or do poor work. Poor
work directly relates to the significance of the role each airport security checkpoint
screener has in controlling the increasing problem of aviation terrorism and providing the
needed level of safety for each passenger.
To a lesser degree, it was found that the participants derived considerable job
satisfaction in helping people (i.e., passengers), wanting to learn a new skill, and in the
perceived high level of responsibility that came naturally with the job. Equally important
was the social environment provided by their work atmosphere. The participants enjoyed
their work because it allowed them to be around people, and offered them companionship
through their co-workers. This was noted especially true for the older screener age group
The job environment offered them companionship and an environment that might be hard
to find elsewhere. It was the participant's perception that the job offered older screeners
"a good way to pass time withfriends".These factors grouped together were important
considerations in the decision to remain on the job. Along the same line, friendliness

107
appears to be one of the distinguishing characteristics of a good work environment for the
participants. A relaxed attitude and relative lack of a social hierarchy between
management and screeners would be more effective in this situation. Given the lack of
compensation and benefits provided, these factors were crucial in comparing their current
jobs to other available opportunities.
Many participants felt that management did not share an atmosphere of mutual
respect. This has a negative effect on how everyday work conflicts (which are inevitable
in every work environment) are handled. Participants noted social aspect that affected job
satisfaction. Specifically noted was the fact that management was not fair to the
employees and took advantage of them. One example given from a screener was a time
when she was asked to work longer because of a shortage of employees due to snow. She
agreed to help out. However, the public transportation she depended on to get home had
been delayed do to the weather. At the end of the night after her extra hours she could
not get home. The company had a van at the airport that gave management rides home in
situations like this. However, the company would not take her home. Listening to the
examples during the workshop made it clear that many unfair situations like this occur on
a day to day basis for these employees.
Most participants agreed that changing the social environment to one that limited
contact with people would cause them to become dissatisfied and be a reason to want to
leave. A number of examples of isolated work situations in airport security were provided
by participants, and these positions were considered as the least desirable roles in the
company.
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Job convenience factors, work experience, and the airport environment also played
a significant role in remaining on the job. Participants evaluated theflexibilityof the work
schedule as a primary reason to continue airport security work. The ability to change
work days or schedule work hours, even on short notice, was a key element in remaining
on the job. It became readily apparent that changes to this freedom offlexibility,or
procedures to limit or restrict the ease of changing scheduled work hours (i.e., for
management to obtain a more reliable and predictable workforce), would have a
detrimental effect on retention. The jobs of an airport checkpoint security screener and
supervisor were also perceived by participants as good work experience and could lead to
potentially better opportunities. The high responsibility of the job and perspective job
contacts at the airport played a major role in this outcome. In addition, the airport
environment was considered a comfortable place to work and was also evaluated as a
source of job satisfaction.
Thefinalgeneral category ofjob satisfaction (i.e., recognition), was an area of
considerable discussion in each of the three workshops. Lack of appreciation and
recognition for the roles they play was a primary concern for the workshop participants.
In an earlier FAA study conducted by L.A. Witt and C. Hellman (1992), they noted
Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, and Sowa (1986) for their suggestion that employees
are more inclined to commitment and satisfaction when they feel that their organization
values their input and cares about their well being. The study also noted that employees
form global beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization is supportive of them
and that perceived organizational support is related to increased commitment and
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innovation and reduced absenteeism. One screener remarked, "...no ones character is
taken into consideration. You are spoken to in a degrading manner. Your word has no
bearing. There is no right when the employees are concerned". One example (of many)
that a screener gave of a situation where a lack of respect is given towards her and her
employees is shown in Text Box 2.

Text Box 2. Example Given of Lack of Respect.

"Example: The Director's Wife came through the
screening checkpoint area 'which was very busy at the
time 1 ; there was only one hand scanner. The CSS asked
if she minded if she was hand searched? She replied
'Yes I mind 1 . So following regulations she was
informed that she would have to wait and be searched
before she could enter the sterile area. The search
was conducted and she went on her way. A while later
the CSS was called to the office and told that there
was a complaint made that she touched the Director's
wife's breast. The allegations were denied and the CSS
told what had happened at the checkpoint. Management
replied that they new she did not do it, however,
because it was the Director's wife something needed to
be done. The action taken: the supervisor was
suspended for two days with out pay"-

Comparatively, recognition was almost as important as compensation and benefits
and was a greater contributor to job satisfaction than the social or intrinsic rewards
associated with the job. However, the recognition factors were rated as job conditions
they would like to have, rather than job features as they currently have. Few participants
perceived they were receiving adequate recognition for their performance; and as the data
indicate, recognition by supervisors, managers, and the securityfirmwere valued highly as

a source of job satisfaction. Recognition by passengers was considered a potential source
of job satisfaction, however; screeners acknowledged that this was not expected of
passengers, nor could any intervention change this job element.
Vine (1982), however, in his article "Airport Security tips (for those new to the
screening game)" points out some interesting facts that can reduce thefrustrationof the
passenger and ultimate improve the relationship between passenger and screener. One
example give was to utilize guide rails or ropes and stanchions that directfirsttime
passengers and experienced air-travelers who may not be familiar with a specific airport
layout. These devices narrow groups into single file lines and eliminate the need to shout
directions. Vine also indicates that the use of signs at the exiting end help reduce
congestion and eliminate repeated questions. If everyone is allowed down the concourse,
it is estimated that the number of people screened will be three times the number of
passengers. If there are no concessions on the concourse, passengers will return to the
terminal and increase the screening workload by 50 percent. This causes a delay and can
causefrustrationfor both the costumer (passenger) and the employee (screener).
On the occasions where passengers did express their appreciation, participants did
feel it added to their enjoyment of the job, even if only temporarily. Interactions with
passengers was more likely to contribute to job satisfaction. It is apparent from the data
and some of the issues presented here that there are considerable number of job satisfiers
and factors that contribute to a screener's decision to remain on the job.
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Dissatisfiers and Dislikes
The reader is referred to Table 6 (page 82) for a complete description and
evaluation of Dissatisfiers that were derived through the Delphi process. The following
discussion will provide clarification to those factors that contribute significantly to the
turnover problem, and to provide some additional illustration for the factors.
The major reasons to quit airport security work were clearly focused on monetary
issues. Poor pay, little or no medical benefits, absence of a retirement program, and a
perception that the amount of work required was considerably in excess of that
appropriate for minimum wage, were all strong sources ofjob dissatisfaction. However,
the datafromthis section was hard to group because there was a less concordance
between facilities than that observed with the satisfaction and motivation objective.
Additionally, it was observed that it was not uncommon for individuals to accept
employment on a temporary basis (i.e., for a second income and a college student between
semesters) and then terminate their employment when their needs were met. The Delphi
workshops clearly identified that "pre-planned" limited employment was a major cause of
turnover. Given the extensive array of negative elements of airport security work, and the
comparatively poor compensation package, most screeners could be considered as actively
involved in the job market. Most personnel are searching for opportunities that provide
better benefits. Found a better job was evaluated as one of the primary reasons for the
high turnover problem.
Several other factors that were considered important sources of job dissatisfaction
or reasons to terminate employment voluntarily can be described as management problems
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and management practices. Problems with supervisors (e.g., public and improper
disciplinary techniques), supervision criticism (i.e., imbalance between disciplinary and
recognition/positive interactions), lack of appreciation, management not responsive to
complaints or suggestions (i.e., little or no input sought from screeners and supervisors on
technical or procedural matters), and little opportunity for advancement with the
organization were strong contributors to job dissatisfaction. Considerable discussion and
screener input throughout the Delphi workshops attributed much cause for turnover and
job dissatisfaction to management practices. There was a predominant attitude that
compensation and benefit issues were also directly related to management. The
overwhelming "(mis) perception" that exists portrays the securityfirmsas highly profitable
companies that generate revenues by underpaying employees. It was apparent that
screeners and supervisors have little or no understanding of the organization's structure or
the contractual relationships (including the underbidding process of winning a contract)
that exist between airline carriers and their company.
Intervention can achieve desirable effects on these two additional yet significant
factors that contribute to job dissatisfaction. First, company policies and consequences for
"making a mistake or being wrong" (e.g., missing an FAA test object, passenger/aircrew
complaint) were perceived as harsh and punitive. The concern that led to this factor being
evaluated as an important job dissatisfier was not the consequences of making a mistake
but rather it was related to the lack of recognition for outstanding performance. All
participants were deeply concerned and dissatisfied that good performance was never
rewarded, or only minimally rewarded (e.g., $25 bonus for FAA target detection). If a
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reward was given it was to a select few that were friends with management. The politics
involved were noted as being very discriminatory and unfair. To be motivated to perform
well, an individual mustfirstof all value the rewards offered. Defining appropriate
rewards for good performance is an issue that management needs to deal with. Defining
appropriate rewards becomes easier when management can compare their similar needs
with that of the airport security checkpoint screener. Perhaps the best way to determine
what rewards are important to a screener would be simply just to ask them.
Ramifications for an error were exceedingly severe (i.e., suspension, termination,
re-training). The ratio of rewards to punishments, and the relationship of
acknowledgments to admonishment were the focus of many discussions. The second issue
that was rated as a key element of job dissatisfaction and can be company controlled is a
complaint of "not being told up-front what to expect." The workshop participants felt
company procedures during the interviewing/hiring process need to be improved to more
accurately portray the job and duties. Participants felt many new hires quickly terminated
their employment because they were not aware of pertinent job requirements until actually
physically working the checkpoint. A clear understanding that must exist between
management and individual screener of job demands and expectations so that role
perceptions are completely clarified. Continuous feedback is necessary between
supervisors/management and the screener in an open, trusting, and truthful manner so that
expectations on both sides can remain clear and even be changed if necessary. Feedback is
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of success.
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Other important factors that lead to job dissatisfaction, but are less easily mitigated
as they are elements inherent in the work include: stressful conditions, physical discomfort
caused by lifting and remaining in a standing position throughout the shift, physical
discomfort to the employees eyes, and passenger hostility. These factors in and of
themselves are not likely to cause self-termination, although they do contribute to job
dissatisfaction.
A work environment that meets an organization's objectives and satisfies the jobrelated needs of the security screener has much influence on the productivity and stability
of the group. A positive, long-lasting, productive, work environment focuses around the
image and impression that the screeners have about the dynamics of the security firm. A
high degree of clarity must exist so that each individual screener knows exactly what
his/her job entails and how his/her assignment contributes to the success of the screening
team. Recognition is needed for a screener when he/she does good work. Good work
should be rewarded more often than bad performance is criticized. Lastly, teamwork
involves a feeling of belonging to an organization completely. The screeners at the
checkpoint should be characterized ultimately by cohesion, commitment, mutual warmth,
support, trust, and pride.
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Initial Recommendations to Improve Employee Job Satisfaction, Decrease Employee
Job Dissatisfaction and Increase Career Longevity
The findings from the Delphi workgroups indicate that several
interventions can be considered to improve employee tenure while consequently increasing
the experience base of the workforce. Several suggested measures require extensive work
in the development of training seminars and are more appropriately suited for a separate
publication. The recommendations are as follows:
1.

Increase the starting wages of screener personnel to be competitive with
current market conditions in order to attract more qualified applicants.
Below market wages create a workforce that is continually involved in jobseeking activities.

2.

Improve salary advancement schedules to compensate screener personnel
for increased experience and tenure on position. This measure is intended
to retain personnel who perform effectively. Wage increases should be of
small magnitude, but on frequent intervals. Frozen salary schedules
promotes increased job seeking activities.

3.

Consider company contributions to health coverage benefits in order to
curtail the job seeking activities of quality personnel. A significant number
of workshop participants were actively exploring the employment market
primarily to acquire health coverage. Company contributions are
suggested to increase with tenure to retain desirable employees. Gradual
increases in company contributions that reduce the employee's share of
medical coverage can be promoted as wage increases that do not increase
the employee's taxable income. Current IRS laws also permit employees to
set aside non-taxable income for use in covering medical expenses. An
initial step in providing health coverage might be to establish such an
individual fund on a voluntary basis.

4.

Improve staffing levels at security checkpoints to mitigate high workload
levels during peak passenger traffic periods. This can be accomplished
indirectly by improving employee tenure. Employee staffing levels become
problematic since the number of personnel on any given day are uncertain
due to high turnover rates. High turnover rates characteristically create an
unstable workforce with high proportions of inexperienced PBS personnel.
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Experienced personnel are further diluted to provide training on tinuous
basis because of the constant influx of new hires.
5.

Consider the possibility of an employee contribution retirement program
with a graduated scale of company contributions that is dependent on
length of employee tenure. Eligibility can be established after six months
with a low company contributions that is determined by length of tenure.
Several options are currently available throughfinancialand brokerage
institutions that have little or no administrative cost to the participating
employer. The benefit can be offered on a voluntary participation basis.
Regardless, the facilitators found the preliminaryfindingsindicated
retirement benefits are an issue of high importance.

6.

Provide internal supervisory skills training and recurrent
leadership/organization skills training to checkpoint supervisors.
Considerable job dissatisfaction due to supervisor-screener relationships
was identified in the Delphi workshops, as checkpoint supervisors had no
opportunity to learn appropriate techniques. Although CSS personnel
were technically competent and experienced with security operations, most
were not provided with formalized and recurrent training in supervisory
skills. Role modeling and management exercises are necessary components
of this process. The U.S. military offers an excellent model of this type of
training.
Offering basic and advanced training in these skill areas further improves
the value of the employee to the company while concurrently increasing the
marketability of the individual for positions external to the company. It is
anticipated that many supervisors would increase their company tenure if
they improved their management skills and experience base as an avenue to
broaden their opportunities outside the company. The company would
therefore be providing no-cost training to employees in return for greater
tenure, with the expectation of the individual eventually leaving thefirmto
advance their careers. The opportunity for professional growth would be
perceived as an employee benefit while the company would enjoy the
services of higher quality personnel during their employment. An indirect
company benefit would be greater responsibility for CSS personnel to
handle conflict resolution.
It should also be pointed out that "no opportunity for advancement" was a
major factor of perceived importance in contributing to self-termination.
Advancement within security companies is limited, and expansion of
external opportunities is warranted. Training and education in related areas
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English as a second language) can also be offered internally as a benefit to
both employee and the company.
"Not told upfrontwhat to expect" was another major issue of job
dissatisfaction. Briefly, extensive discussion focused on the lack of
information provided about job requirements during the application/hiring
process. General consensus among participants identified lack of
understanding among personnel officers and interviewers as the basis for
this problem.
It is strongly recommended that company personnel responsible for the
recruitment,hiring, interviewing, and processing of applicants undergo the
ATA training curriculum to the level of certification. The selection process
can be significantly improved by offering applicants expanded information
about job demands, expectations, and requirements. This intervention will
permit the opportunity for applicants to de-select themselves from further
consideration before considerable company training resources are invested.
Provide basic training and demonstration to all employees in job related
areas (i.e., lifting heavy/bulk articles, human inter-personal
communications) to reduce job-related stress and physical discomfort.
Much of the job-related stress evolvesfrompassenger and aircrew
interactions. Clearly a seminar-formatted training program with periodic
recurrent training is required in group dynamics, patterns of
communications, conflict resolutions, and similar areas. Additional training
in these areas benefits the company in reduced aircrew/passenger
complaints, improved employee-employee relationships, and passenger
compliance. Consequently, improving the marketability of the employee
for external opportunities.
Several areas and issues centered on management communications and
responsiveness. The research team noted that screener and CSS personnel
held widespread misperceptions and attitudes toward management that
were not based in fact. As an example, misperceptions ranged from benefit
issues (i.e., calculations of annual vacation/leave time) to promotion issues
(i.e., profit margins of security firms). Much of these widespread
misperceptions were based on a lack available accurate information and the
development of alternate explanations by employees.
Management interface and accessibility to all subordinate company
employees is a readily apparent intervention. We suggest at least a periodic
physical presence of management personnel at the checkpoints to gain first
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hand awareness of potential problems and to observe screener/CSS
performance directly.
In consonance with these activities, it is also suggested that relevant
company information is relayed to employees on a regular basis. This may
be accomplished several ways such as through monthly newsletters
briefings. Sharing all company issues and concerns with employees is not
advocated, but addressing areas of misperceptions to a level sufficient for
dispelling false information and attitudes, is recommended.
10.

A major source of job dissatisfaction for screener and supervisory
personnel can best be described as an imbalance in the relationship between
performance and consequences. Indeed, "fear of making a mistake or
being wrong" and several reward issues were central to the Delphi
objectives for career satisfaction and dissatisfaction. While consequences
or failing tests or missing targets rangedfromremedial training,
suspension, or termination; rewards for successful performance were
perceived as minimal and highly infrequent. One participant even remarked
that passenger gratuities (i.e., for assisting handicapped travelers)
generated more additional income than rewards from the company.

The following potential incentive programs will recognize successful performance
and act as a guide for employee incentives and rewards:
•

company contributions to a local award fund to acknowledge
superior employees on a monthly basis. The fund should focus on
employee recognition as the primary goal with awards consisting of
retail and restaurant gift certificates, saving bonds, or small cash
awards.

•

service pins or other uniform designations to acknowledge
company tenure.

•

certificated and training record entries to document the completion
of the previously identified training courses. Employees should be
aware that these accomplishments will be documented on letters of
recommendations.

•

cohipany non-cash awards (i.e., paid day off) for successful
performance in FAA tests.

•

air carrier provided incentives for outstanding critical performance.

- cash awards
- use of amenity lounges for specified time periods
- standby or restricted airline seats for domestic travel
- amenity coupons (i.e., $5.00 airport food establishment
vouchers)
•

competitive selection and recognition of screener and CSS of the
quarter and year.

Although the incentives have a monetary value on their own, the primary objective
for such programs is to convey supervisor and company recognition for performance.
Recognition of desirable performance is an integral component of employee satisfaction
and will contribute to career tenure.
The suggestions provided above were not meant to be exhaustive, but were given
only to demonstrate the broad range that incentives can cover. Air carrier participation
was suggested as an important element of this process since security personnel represent
and act on behalf of carriers. It is to the benefits of the carriers to support such programs.
Beyond the obvious responsibility and obligation of the carriers under FARs to maintain
adequate security measures by employing qualified personnel, screener and CSS personnel
directly impact passenger satisfaction and comfort. Improvements in employee tenure
provides a more experienced, stabilized, well-trained, and reliable workforce. A
dependable and experienced workforce directly impacts passenger flow by reducing
passenger processing time that resultsfrominadequate staffing levels and the
comparatively slower performance that is characteristic of novice workers.
If security personnel are provided the training seminars identified earlier, a
significant decline in aircrew/passenger complaints could be realized. Professional and
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courteous service by security personnel would reflect positively on the carrier as
passengers experience less delays and confrontations. It is to this end that air carrier
support and cooperation is needed.
In summary, numerous recommendations have been offered with the goal to
improve job satisfaction and increase employee tenure on the job. These interventions
would have a direct impact on reducing employee turnover, increasing the experience base
of the workforce, decreasing the demand on training resources, lowering the cost of
recruitment and selection, and providing stability to the workforce. Given the effective
security at airport facilities is by its very nature a team effort, improved workforce stability
and longer employee tenure should increase performance of the overall security system.
These interventions are based entirely on the work completed. The suggested
interventions are just that "suggested". They have been proposed in response to those
item/issues that were evaluated by security personnel as having the greatest impact on job
satisfaction and reasons to leave the job.
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PRE-BOARD X-RAY SCREENER SELECTION
WORKSHOP AGENDA
DAY 1
8:00 - 9:00

Welcome and Introduction of Participants and Staff
Brief Overview of Project, Goals, and Objectives
Complete Participant Background Sheet, Pre-Workshop Survey
and Pay Voucher

9:00 - 9:30

COFFEE BREAK
Distribute Workshop Materials
Question & Answer Session on Workshop Objectives & Techniques
Administrative & Payroll Items

9:30 - 10:30

Workshop Training Session

10:30 - 12:00

Discuss & Begin Objective I (Personality Items & Abilities)

1200 - 1:00

LUNCH

1:00 - 3:00

Objective I Work Session

3:00 - 3:15

BREAK

3:15 - 4:45

Complete Objective I (Consensus)

4:45 - 5:00

Day 1 Wrap-Up
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DAY 2
8:00 - 9:30

Discuss & Begin Objective II (Job Satisfiers and Motivators)

9:30 - 9:45

COFFEE BREAK

9:45 - 10:45

Objective U Work Session

10:45 - 12:00

Complete Objective U (Consensus)

12:00 - 1:00

LUNCH

1:00 - 2:30

Discuss & Begin Objective IJJ (Reasons to Dislike Job or Quit)

2:30 - 2:45

COFFEE BREAK

2:45 - 3:30

Continue Objective UJ Work Session

3:30 - 4:45

Complete Objective HI (Consensus)

4:45 - 5:00

Post-Workshop Surveys and Workshop Wrap-Up
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SMALL GROUP DELPHI OVERVIEW

Delphi methods help the way we communicate within and between groups of people. The
purpose of "having a Delphi" is to deal with a complex problem by bringing together a group of
people who have the skills and expertise required, and to provide you with a structured way to
communicate with one another to solve the problem. The Delphi methods help us to keep our
attention on coming together with good solutions. We will be using a modification of Delphi
techniques. This modification is one that uses small group techniques like feedback, information
sharing, help from trained group leaders, acceptance of everybody's ideas, working as a group,
and more. This way, the good ideas of each member of the group are used. The group develops a
team spirit which leads to good and valuable results.

We take this opportunity to welcome you to the Workshop. We look forward to working
with you and coming up with ideas that will help the FAA and us with putting together a test to hire
new screeners.
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PRE-BOARD X-RAY SCREENER SELECTION
Introduction
The job of pre-board x-ray screener is an extremely important one. Your efforts are
responsible for the protection of the lives and safety of millions of travelers each year. Your
presence at airports helps to discourage would-be terrorist actions. How well you perform your
job makes this possible. The amount of pay you receive to do this job does not reflect upon its
importance. The job is so important that it is necessary that we only hire those who are best able to
do the job, and who are willing to continue as screeners. That is the purpose of this workshop...
to ask your help in finding the right people.
In order to be able to hire the right people for the job of airport security screening it is
necessary to make proper tests. Those who do well on the tests should do well on the job; those
who do poorly on the tests we would expect to do poorly on the job. For instance, if someone
does poorly on some sort of math test, we would not expect them to be good cashiers or
bookkeepers. The tests have to be accurate in order to work. This means we should also Sxpect
some people to do well on the tests while others do just OK or poorly. The entire idea is to figure
out who will be successful and who won't be successful as a security screener by using the results
of the tests we give them.
One way to create these tests is to have successful and experienced screeners and CSS's,
such as yourself, give the abilities, and rate them for importance, that are necessary to be a
successful screener. It is also very important to know what things about the job cause you to want
to keep the job, and for what reasons others quit. So, we really need to find out what it takes to be
a successful screener, and why you and others like you want to keep this kind of job. Then it is
simply a matter of finding other people who are like you.
But how do we know if the tests work? We can be sure of two things. One, that you
know what abilities and personality is needed to be a successful screener. And two, that we are
pretty capable of making tests to measure what you say are important characteristics. But we still
need to be sure we are both right....we wouldn't want to make mistakes and hire people who can
not do the job because they aren't capable, or who will quit soon after getting the job. We also do
not want to not hire people who would be good screeners because the tests are not accurate.
We can do this by hiring people for the job and then giving them the tests. After training
and a few weeks on the job we can see how well they detect targets. If we all did our job right;
those who are not very good at screening, or who quit, would not have done very well on the tests
we made. We would also expect that those who are good at performing the test also did well on
the job.
Now, back to where you fit in. You will be participating in the workshop to give your
ideas on what skills, abilities, personality traits, and reasons to stay on the job are important for
being a successful screener. Only you have a real understanding of this since you do the job. You
are the EXPERTS. You will also be asked during the workshop to judge and rate those abilities,
skills, reasons, and personality traits that are the most important to being a successful screener.
We will also ask you for your opinions and ideas on how to measure how well a screener
does the job. Since you are the experts, you are the people best able to decide if a person can do
the job or not. This is only if time permits.
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WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES
The work will be based on your experience, knowledge, and some materials that we will provide.
As a group, we will:
Objective 1:

Develop a list of the personality traits, characteristics, and abilities that YOU feel
that an x-ray screener has - and needs to have - to be a superior screener. We
want to know what makes the best screeners the BEST screeners. This will be
done by:
A.

Changing or "scrubbing" the list that will be provided to you by adding
things you think are important and are not on the list, or by removing items
that you feel are not needed. The final list should only have items you feel
are truly important to being a successful screener.

B.

Using a "critical incident methodology" to consider the list carefully and
making any final changes. We will explain this during training. For now,
consider it as thinking of really unusual and great screener targets detected
and why they happened — what is it about the incident that made it happen.

C.

Rate the final list of items using the scales we provide to you.

Objectives 2 & 3: Develop a set of job satisfiers and dislikes that impact screener decisions to stay
on, or leave the job.
A.

Identify, discuss and make a list of the reasons why people enjoy or stay on
the job. We want you to consider what is there about the job that keeps you
and your fellow workers returning to the job each week.

B.

Identify, discuss and make a list of the reasons why people do not like the
job or quit. What are the reasons others have told you they are quitting.

C.

Considering both lists, what do you suggest, can be done to improve the
job, make it more enjoyable and satisfying, or how the pay and reward
system can be made better. What will need to be changed to help people
decide to stay on the job.
NOTE: We do not want to discuss only the negative aspects of the job; we
also want to discuss how to keep yourself and others on the job
and with the company.

D.

For each of the two lists you created, rate the items using the scales
provided.
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 1A
We have prepared an initial list of
characteristics and abilities which may be important
to being a good screener. Part of this list comes
from interviews we have conducted with screeners at
various airports. Some of the list also comes from
standard lists of abilities and traits that are used
in this type of research. Still other traits and
characteristics come from our looking at the X-Ray
screeners job tasks.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?

What we need now is for you, our experts, to take
this list and go through it. In going through it, see
which items you think are not really important to
being a good screener. (By "good screener" we mean a
top-of-the-line, "best you have ever seen" screener).
We also need you to think about which traits and
abilities are not on the list - but need to be.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
The way we will do this is to break up into two
smaller groups and evaluate the list provided. Then
we will rejoin as one group and get one final list by
using the two smaller group lists as the basis.
We need real discussion (yes, even disagreements)
in the smaller, as well as, the whole group. We want
consensus and that won't happen unless each of us is
part of the discussion and each of us can say whatever
we think. OK, at this point we can start the ball
rolling.
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE IB
We have now modified our initial list of
abilities and characteristics which are important to
being a good screener. We have added items you
thought were relevant and were not on the list, and we
have removed items you felt were not needed. The
final list should have only items you feel are truly
important to being a good screener.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
What we need to do now is make additional
refinements to our list of positive abilities and
characteristics. We will utilize the "Critical
Incident Methodology" we briefed you on during
training. Remember to think of really unusual and
great screener targets detected - and most important,
why you think they happened.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Now we will divide up into two small groups so
that you can discuss "Critical Incidents" that you
have experienced. Following this step, join together
again in one group to share your experiences and to
develop a final list of positive abilities and
characteristics.
Remember, any incident you believe significant
needs to be considered. Listen carefully, also, to
what the other group members have to contribute.
Strive for consensus!
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 1C
At this point we have developed a highly refined
list of characteristics and abilities which are
important to being a good screener. We have added
items you thought relevant and removed items not
needed. We have discussed "Critical Incidents" which
have demonstrated good screener performance
qualities. There is one more vital step remaining in
our evaluation process.
STOP - ANY QUESTION?
What we will do now is rate the final list of
positive characteristics and abilities. We will be
using the rating scales and instruments we provided
for you in training. This step is very important, so
we want you to focus on what abilities you believe
are crucial - and rate them accordingly. Please make
sure you clearly understand the rating scales before
proceeding.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Now we will divide up into two small groups so
that you can work on the rating scales. Following
this step, join together again in one group to develop
the final rating scales.
Remember the importance of meaningful discussion
and group consensus. This final step is what we have
been working towards in this workshop, so let's get to
work!
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3A
We have prepared an initial list of reasons which
may be why you enjoy the screening job or choose to
remain in this career field. All of the reasons came
from screeners that were interviewed while doing the
job. Many of the reasons show what several screeners
said about each item. Remember, these are reasons
screeners said why they enjoyed the job.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Would like you to look over the list and see
which items you think are not really important
reasons for enjoying your work or for staying on the
job. (By important we mean that the reason :does make
a difference to you) . We also want you to think about
what reasons are personally important to you and are
not on the list - but you think they need to be. It
doesn't matter if you think the reason is only
important to yourself and no other screeners - if it
is important to you, it needs to be on the list.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
As you have been doing, you will break up into
your groups again and discuss the list provided.
After you finish your discussions, we will come back
into the whole group and put together the final list
by using the lists you developed in you workgroups as
the basis.
As before, we need real discussion and
challenging items during all group work. Add items as
you see fit. Don't worry about what the other group
might think. We need consensus, but that won't happen
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unless each of us participates in the discussion and
says what they think.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Back to your workgroups again. Remember if it's
important to you, it may be important to the
workshop.
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3B
We have also prepared an initial list of job
qualities which may contribute to an X-Ray screener
disliking the work and/or choosing to leave this
career field. This list was prepared in the same
manner as the initial list in Objective 3A. Remember,
these are comments from actual screeners.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
We would like you to look over this list and
determine which items you think are not the really
important reasons for disliking the work as an X-Ray
screener. We also want you to consider what qualities
are not on the list - but should be. Remember, if it
is important to you, then it should be on the list.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Now we will break up into two smaller groups and
evaluate the list we provided. Following this step,
join together again in one group and generate a final
list for this objective.
Remember the key elements of this step:
meaningful discussion and group consensus. What you
have to say is very important, even if a group member
disagrees. Be willing to listen to what other group
members have to say - then everyone will be encouraged
to participate.
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3D
We have now generated two lists of job qualities
which are part of screener decisions to stay on the
job, or leave. We have developed a group consensus on
why people enjoy X-Ray screener work, and on why
people dislike the work. We have accomplished these
objectives through meaningful discussion in your
group.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
What we need to do now is to rate the final list
of job qualities. We will be utilizing the rating
scales and instruments that were provided for you in
training. This step is very important, so we want to
concentrate on what job qualities you believe are
significant - and rate them accordingly. Please
ensure that you clearly understand the rating scales
before we proceed.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Now we will break up into smaller groups and work
on the rating scales. After this step, we will gather
together in our large group to generate the final
rating scales.
Remember, again, the value of meaningful
discussion and group consensus.
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Pre-board X-rav Screener Selection:
Participant Background

Name

1.

Company working for:

2.

Time at current job:

3.

Current airport assigned:

4.

Total length of time with company:

5.

Position (Check all that apply):

months

CSS
Screener
Instructor
Management
6.

X-ray screening system you use:

6a.

Other systems you have used:

7.

Other airport screening companies you have worked for:

8.

Training received and when (month, year):
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PROTOCOLS FOR OBJECTIVE 3C
We have now generated two lists of job qualities
which are part of screener decisions to stay on, or
leave, the job. We have developed a group consensus
on why people enjoy X-Ray screener work, and on why
people dislike the work. We have accomplished these
objectives through meaningful discussion in your
group.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
What we need to do now is develop suggestions for
improving X-Ray screener work. Considering both
lists, what can be done to make the work more
enjoyable and satisfying. Are changes necessary in
the pay and reward system, and so on. This is an
opportunity for you to make suggestions that could
improve the quality of your working environment.
STOP - ANY QUESTIONS?
Now we will divide up into two small groups and
evaluate these two lists. After completing this step,
we will gather together in one group to develop two
final lists for this objective.
Remember we don't want to discuss only the
negative aspects of the job - we also want to discuss
how to improve the working environment and encourage
employees to stay on. So let's get on with it.
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PRE-WORKSHOP SURVEY

As a pre-board x-ray screener (in this group
of screeners), my skills in understanding
and evaluating the job put me about here,
relative to the others.

I think my ideas will be in agreement with
the rest of the screeners in this group.

I know most of the screeners very well.

Very Highly
Skilled
1

No Skill
At All

Yes,
absolutely
1
2

No, not
at all

Yes,
prettv much
1
2

3

No, none
at all
3

Yes,
I have some definite ideas about what the
necessary skills and abilities are for
success as a screener.

1

No,
none
2

3

2

3

I have been in airport screening longer than
most of the other screeners here.

Yes

I am anticipating that the workshop is going
to be a good experience and will accomplish
what we need to do.

Yes, I think
it will be
1

1

No

No, I think
it may be a
waste of time
6

144

Objective 1
(Personality Items and Abilities)

Directions: Referring to the following personality items and abilities, please circle the number
that best represents your feeling. Answer quickly — your first impression is often your best.
Please rate each of the following qualities regarding their contribution to superior performance:

Absolutely
Unnecessary

Somewhat
Helpful

Important

Absolutely
Necessary

1.

Persistent

L

2

3

4

5

2.

Suspicious

[

2

3

4

. 5

3.

Assertive

1

2

3

4

5

4.

Trusting

I

2

3

4

5

5.

Confident

I

2

3

4

5

6.

Dependable & Responsible

I

2

3

4

5

7.

Forceful

[

2

3

4

5

8.

Observant, Alert, & Attentive

I

2

3

4

5

9.

Curious

[

2

3

4

5

10.

Cooperative & Team Player

I

2

3

4

5

11.

Outgoing

1

2

3

4

5

12.

Enthusiastic & Energetic

[

2

3

4

5

13.

Motivated

[

2

3

4

5

14.

Thorough

I

2

3

4

5

15.

Tactful

1[

2

3

4

5

16.

Courteous & Respectful

[

2

3

4

5

17.

Cautious

I

2

3

4

5

18.

Sensitive

1

2

3

4

5

19.

Helpful

1I

2

3

4

5

20.

Calm

1[

2

3

4

5

21.

Positive Mental Attitude

i

2

3

4

5

22.

Concerned

1

2

3

4

5

23.

Tolerance

[

2

3

4

5

24.

Honest

[

2

3

4

5
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Objective 2
(Job Satisfiers and Motivators)
Directions: Referring to the following job satisfiers and motivators, please circle the number
that best represents your feeling. Answer quickly — your first impression is often your best.
In terms of a reason why I try to/want to stay on the job, I would say that this reason is:

Absolutely
Unnecessary

Somewhat
Helpful

Important

Absolutely
Necessary

5

1.

Importance of the
work I do

L

2

3

4

2.

High responsibility
of the job

L

2

3

4

3.

Enjoy helping people

I

2

4.

Like working with
co-workers (companionship)

I

2

5.

Enjoy being busy

I

2

6.

Comfortable place
to work

I

2

7.

Medical benefits

I

2

8.

Enjoy controlling people

I

2

9.

Retirement benefits

I

2

10.

Chance to move into
supervisory jobs

I

2

11.

Good general work experience

1

2

12.

Wages job pays

L

2

13.

Being around people

I

2

14.

Doing airport security work

[

2

15.

Appreciation "by"
supervisors

i

16.

Job is challenging (doing a job
few others can do)

17.

5
*

3
3

4
4

5
5

3
3

4
4

5
5

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

[

2

3

4

5

Wanted to learn
something new

i

2

3

4

5

18.

Dislike other jobs that
were available

[

2

3

4

5

19.

Desire to protect people

[

2

3

4

5

20.

My family & friends think
the job is important

i

2

3

4

5
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Objective 2 - continued

Absolutely
Unnecessary

Somewhat
Helpful

21.

Appreciation "of supervisors

I

2

22.

Pride in my work

I

2

23.

Thrill of finding targets

L

2

24.

Job is easy

I

2

25.

Wanted to work in airports

I

2

26.

Flexible hours and days

I

2

27.

Opportunity for rewards

I

2

28.

To make friends

I

2

29.

Want to stop terrorist acts

[

2

30.

Recognition by company

I

2

31.

Potential job contacts

[

2

32.

Makes a good second income

L

2

Important

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Absolutely
Necessary

5
5
5
5
5
5
• 5
5
5
5
5
5
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Objective 3
(Reasons to Dislike Job or Quit)
Directions: Referring to the following items, please circle the number that best represents your
feeling about why people quit and/or dislike being a screener. Answer quickly — your first
impression is often your best.

No Effect
Whatsoever

Little Effect
If Any

Important

Major
Reason

1.

Stressful

2

3

4

2.

Poor pay

2

3

4

3.

Dislike hours

2

3

4

4.

Don't like working
weekends

2

3

4

5.

Hard to get to work

2

3

4

6.

Job is boring

2

3

4

7.

Dislike co-workers

2

3

4

8.

Litde or no medical benefits

2

3

4

9.

Job is too difficult

2

3

4

10.

No retirement program

2

3

4

11.

Not appreciated

2

3

4

12.

Too much work for
amount of pay

2

3

4

13.

Found "better" job

2

3

4

14.

Having to work holidays

2

3

4

15.

Job is causing physical
discomfort (backache,
headache, eye strain, etc.)

2

3

4

16.

Family and/or spouse
wants me to quit

17.

Job is too fast paced

2

3

4

18.

Breaks/lunch time not enough

2

3

4

19.

No opportunities for
advancement

2

3

4

5
5
5

20.

Just doing job temporarily
to earn extra money

2

3

4

5

21.

Don't want to work
in airports

2

3

4

5

22.

Criticism by supervisors

2

3

4

5

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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Objective 3 - continued

Absolutely
Unnecessary

23.

I don'tfindjob important

24.

Confronting passengers

25.

Fear of finding weapons

26.

Job wasn't what I thought it was

27.

Decisions have to be
made too fast

28.

Afraid to make a mistake
or be wrong

29.

Somewhat
Helpful

Important

Absolutely
Necessary

4
4

5
5

4

5
5
5

5
5
5
5

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4

Passenger hostility

2

3

4

30.

Work is tiring and exhausting

2

3

4

31.

Not told up front what to expect

2

3

4

32.

Not being kept abreast of
what's going on

2

3

4

33.

Management not listening to
suggestions and/or complaints
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GROUP GOALS SURVEY — PROCESS
How clear are the group goals?
1
2
No apparent goals
Goal confusion,
uncertainty, or conflict

3
Average goal
clarity

Goals mostly
clear

Goals very
clear

Considerable trust
and openness

Strong trust
and openness

Better than usual
listening

Outstanding
sensitivity
to others

Some leadership sharing
among a few group
members

Leadership functions
distributed among
everyone

Leadership needs
met creatively
and flexibly.
Everyone helped
lead the group

Majority vote

Attempts at considering
all points of view

Full participation
and consensus

Average use of group
members

Group resources well
used and all opinions
encouraged

Individual
opinions fully
and effectively
used

Some warm sense of
belonging

Strong sense of
belonging among
members

How much trust and openness in the group?
1
2
3
Distrust
Little trust
Average trust and
openness

How sensitive and aware are group members?
1
2
3
No awareness or
Most members only
Average sensitivity
listening in the group
interested in their
and listening
own views

4. How were group leadership needs met?
1
2
Not met, drifting
Leadership was by
one person

5. How were group decisions made?
1
2
No decisions could
Made by a few
be reached

How well were group
1
One or two contributed,
but everyone else was
silent discouraged

resources used?
2
Several tried to
contribute, but were

7. How much loyalty and sense of belonging to the group?
3
1
2
About average sense
Members had no group
Members not close but
of belonging
loyalty or sense of
some friendly relations
belonging

POST-WORKSHOP SURVEY — PRODUCTS
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I feel satisfied with
the results.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I'm not really happy with
the results at all.

I learned ideas from
the feedback.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I didn't learn a thing from
from the feedback.

In general, I agreed
with the ideas in the
feedback.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I disagreed with everything
in the feedback.

I could express my ideas _
o.k. this way.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I couldn't really say what
I wanted to say.

3

4

5

6

7

I didn't feel the need to
talk at all.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I think people understood
my reasons pretty well.

2

3

4

5

6

7

I think it went too
slowly.

I feel as if I really
wanted to talk to
people.

1

I have a feeling people
didn't understand or
1
think about my reasons.

I think it went too
quickly.

1

2
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APPENDIX B
Cover Letter

EMBRY-RIDDLE
AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd.

Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900

(+1) (904) 226-6385

FAX (+1) (904) 226-7050

Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research

July 11, 1994

Dear Participant:
On behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University, welcome to the Delphi Workshop for Airline Passenger Pre-board Security
Screeners. You have been carefully selected from among your colleagues because of
your experience and skill. Your personal contribution and enthusiasm is 'greatly
appreciated and will make a difference. The input and ideas you bring to the
workshop will help decide the course of how to select future applicants for this vital
career field.
Most of your efforts will take place during the actual workshop. However, to be
productive and allow the workshop to run smoothly, some preparation is needed. We
think this will assist you in getting more out of the workshop and will make the
experience more enjoyable.
Attached is a rather substantial amount of information. Don't panic! These are aJi the
materials we will use during the two day workshop — only a small portion is completed
by you before we begin. We wanted to ensure there were no surprises for you on the
day of the workshop.
To ease you through this package we color-coded the materials you need to complete
before the workshop. We also developed a set of steps to take you through the
process. After each step the approximate time to complete the step is provided.
BEFORE THE WORKSHOP:
1. First, look over the PINK Agenda to become familiar with the workshop sequence.
(3 minutes)
2. Read the GREEN Overview information to understand what a Delphi Workshop is.
(3 minutes)
3. Read the BLUE Introduction to acquaint yourself with the project. (5 minutes)

Leading The World In Aviation And Aerospace Education
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4. Look over the GOLD pages. These pages list personality and ability descriptions
and has a rating scale. The descriptions are words screeners used to describe
themselves. Using the rating scale, choose a rating for EACH of the descriptions.
Please write your rating next to each personality description. CHOOSE THE
RATING YOU PERSONALLY FEEL IS MOST ACCURATE
IN
DESCRIBING SUPERIOR SCREENERS. Remember, these are your ratings,
there are no right or wrong answers. (20 minutes)
5. Look over the YELLOW pages. These pages list reasons from fellow screeners
why they enjoy the job and includes a rating scale. Once again, using the rating
scale, select the rating you feel is most accurate based on your personal opinion,
and write your rating next to EACH reason. (20 minutes)
6. Finally, look over the GRAY pages. These pages list reasons from fellow
screeners why they dislike the job or want to quit and a rating scale. As before,
using the rating scale, select the rating that best fits your personal opinion and write
the rating next to each reason. (20 minutes)
All your ratings ARE CONFIDENTIAL! Only you, and the project team, knows your
answers. The security company you work for, the FAA, and the airline has no access
to your individual answers.
The workshop will focus entirely on these topic areas — what makes for a good
screener, and what is it about the job that is enjoyable or causes people to quit.
During the workshop these issues are the center of all group discussions.
Again, thanks for your assistance. We want this to be a fun and rewarding experience
for all....so please help out and "complete your homework".

Sincerely,
The Embry-Riddle Project Team Members

P.S. Most of us were trained to screen and worked the positions a little ourselves.

154

APPENDIX C
Objectives

Objective.
Develop a set of job satisfiers
and dislikes that impact screener decisions
to stay on, or leave the job.
A. Identify, discuss and make a list of
the reasons why people enjoy or stay on the
job. We want you to consider what is there
about the job that keeps you and your fellow
workers returning to the job each week.
B. Identify, discuss and make a list of
the reasons why people do not like the job
or quit. What are the reasons others have
told you they are quitting.
C. Considering both lists, what do you
suggest, can be done to improve the job,
make it more enjoyable and satisfying, or
how the pay and reward system can be made
better. What will need to be changed to
help people decide to stay on the job.
D. For each of the two lists you
created, rate the items using the scales
provided.
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APPENDIX D
Screener Information

Screener Information
APPENDIX D

Airport

Screener
ID #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

'

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
JFK
•:

;..,

Time at Current Job

In Months

In Months

_j

-

FEMALE
MALE
MALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE

13
18
44
46
18
60
19
22
15
60
12
93
13
93

FEMALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE
MALE
MALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
MALE
MALE

69
60
22
82
30
18
72
72
31

:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
SFO
L—.

Time with Company

mmmmmmm :

MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO

"mmmum

Gender

FEMALE
FEMALE
MALE
MALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE
FEMALE
MALE
:&£&&::&:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-::-::-:::

13
18
44
22
18
48
19
11
15
60
12
93
13
93
!

::•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•

168
12
36
31
15
46
17
24
72
11
, ._

31
31
22
31
30
18
24
31
31
31
168
6
36
31
15
46
17
24
72
11

•

:
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APPENDIX E
Pre-Workshop Survey
Question Ratings

Pre-Workshop Survey Question Ratings
APPENDIX E

Airport

Screener
ID #

:

1

2

3

mmmmmmmr

MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO
MCO

QUESTIONS
4

6

5

:V:::::::::::::::::^

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

3
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
4
3
2
3
2
3

5
5
5
3
4
3
1

3
2
2
2
2
3
2

5
5
7
2
2
2
4

2
3
1
1
2
3
1

3
2
3
3
6
2

3
2
3
4
5
2

3
5
3
2
5
1

2
3
3
2
3
2

5
1
5
1
6
1

2
1
2
2
5
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2
1
3

1
1
2

2

2

.,,....;

1

3

7

1

1
2
1
1
4
1

1
4
2
2
4
2

2

1
2
1
1
3
1

7
6
1
1
6
4

1
1
1
3
1
1

4
2
5
5
1
1
1
2
3
6

1
3
4
2
1
1
2
1
1
3

1
3
3
4
2
2
1
2
2
7
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Post-Workshop Survey - Process Question Ratings
APPENDIX F
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